

**Roles in the REDD+ Pilot Project:
The Case of ARK for Project in Kondoa, Dodoma Region, Tanzania**

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DECLARATION

I, **Getrude John Likango**, hereby declare that the presented work, with the exceptions of quotations from cited authors, is my own original work and that it has not been presented to any other university for a similar or any other degree award.

Getrude John Likango,
Oslo, November 2013.

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
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Map 1. Location of Dodoma Region from the Map of Tanzania



Source: *University of Dar es Salaam Institute of Resource Assessment 2013*

ABSTRACT

In 2008 Tanzania was selected to be amongst the countries that would be implementing the REDD Project in its piloting phase as a way of demonstrating how the future REDD would look like. It was selected because of the existence of participatory institutional setup as well as the presence of the big tropical forest cover. Currently, there are nine REDD+ pilot projects implemented in Tanzania, which are also financed by the Norwegian Government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The purpose of this study was to examine the roles ascribed to villagers and how villagers perceived the ascribed roles in one of the REDD+ pilot projects implemented in the Kolo Hills forests in Kondoa District, Dodoma, Tanzania. The study was guided by three research questions namely: “What are the roles that AWF and donors expect villagers to take in the pilot project for REDD at Kolo hills?” The second was “To what extent do the villagers agree to and comply with the roles assigned to them in the REDD pilot project?” and the third was “How do issues of available role compliance can be explained?” The study largely employed a qualitative approach as well as some elements of quantitative research approach. A sample size of 95 respondents from 11 villages in the Kolo Hills as well as some key official from REDD+ project was selected using both purposive and non-purposive sampling techniques. The sample had 51 males and 44 females. The data gathered in this study were transcribed verbatim coded, and analyzed qualitatively according to their content, themes and patterns that emerged.

I found that there were differences on how the REDD+ pilot project was perceived in the Kolo Hills and therefore there were differences in how its roles were conformed and taken up by villagers. This study found out different groups in the compliance aspect. There were the REDD+-Ready, REDD+-Negative, and the REDD+-Ready-but disappointed villagers. The reason behind the varied compliance levels is explained by various factors including improper application of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), delay of the project-side to fulfill the project benefits and promises and so unable to meet villagers’ expectations. Other issues such as the negative experience with the past and neighboring conservation projects, the failure of the project to come with alternative livelihood sources, as well as political influences also explains the situation.

In light of the research findings and conclusions, several recommendations were advanced. One of the several recommendations that I advance is that REDD+ should emphasize communicating the Project especially on the aim, goals and the benefits for more awareness among the villagers who are not willing to comply with the ascribed roles so as to create a more understanding of the Project and its processes, improve and increase the incentives to villages participating so as to

attract their participation, and to find ways of integrating the Government into the Project so as to win the villagers' trust in the Project for their full participation in the roles ascribed. Further, it recommends for a designed donor intervention to ensure the fulfillment of the promises made during the launching of the project so as to maintain the reputation and credibility of the project to villagers.

Moreover, I recommend re-examination of a transparent benefit-sharing mechanism especially in the Joint Forest Management (JFM) for an improved system that will safeguard the villagers' interests because they are the ones who bear the direct costs of forest management. Lastly, the Project should design a gendered program on how to distribute the benefits of the project due to the reason that men and women have differently used the forests, and they are also affected differently by the REDD+ project.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
ARKFor	Advancing REDD in the Kolo Hills Forest
CBFM	Community Based Forest Management
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CCIAM	Climate Change Impacts Adaptation and Mitigation
CFRs	Community Forest Reserves
CM	Committee Members
CO ₂	Carbon dioxide
CV	CBFM Villages
FDC	Finnish Development Cooperation
FPIC	Free and Prior Informed Consent
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HADO	Hifadhi Ardhi Dodoma (Dodoma Land Rehabilitation Program)
Dodoma	
ICFI	International Climate and Forest Initiative
ILO	International Labor Organization
IRA	Institute of Resource Assessment
JFM	Joint Forest Management
JUHIBEKO	Association of Forest Conservators in Kolo and Bereko wards.
JV	JFM Villages
KDC	Kondoa District Council
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
MP	Member of the Parliament
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
Ng.V	Negative Villages
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NORAGRIC	–Department of International Environment and Development Studies
NORDECO	Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology
NV	Neighboring Villages
PES	Payment for Ecological Services
PF	Private Forest
PFM	Participatory Forest Management
PP	Project Personnel
REDD	Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and forest Degradation
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SUM	Center for Environment and Development
TANAPA	Tanzania National Parks
UMB	Norwegian University of Life Sciences
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change
UNREDD	United Nations Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and forest Degradation
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
USAID	United States of Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VFRs	Village Forest Reserves
V	Villager
VL	Village Leader
VLFRs	Village Land Forest Reserves
WCST	Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania

1. INTRODUCTION

This study was part of the Climate Change Impacts Adaptation and Mitigation (CCIAM) Projects in Tanzania that aimed at inquiring into the implication of the REDD+ initiative on smallholders' livelihoods through access to land in Manyara Region Tanzania. Specifically, it aimed at pinpointing the opportunities and challenges available.

My study aimed at exploring villagers' roles from AWF's and the Norwegian Government's perspective, and examining the nature of role compliance at the project level in the REDD+ pilot Project in the Kolo Hills, Kondo. I conducted qualitative interviews and documentary analysis to solicit the information. The major findings from the Kolo Hills' case is that villagers were not uniformly conforming and complying with the roles ascribed to them by the NGO and the donor. The explanation behind this inconsistency in role compliance is explained by various factors including the manner in which the Project was delivered, ambiguities, goal inconsistency, negative background with the past conservation projects, difference in ambitions and interests, and the fact that the Project side is yet to fulfill its part. In reality villagers have the power of self-determination and so they may decide to or not to conform basing on their own justifications. Moreover, the level and nature of conformity is also dependent on how well villagers have been oriented to the project roles by the role provider, how informed they are, and what benefits they are going to get in their engagement. Due to these factors villagers differently conformed to roles in the Kolo Hills REDD+ project.

1.1 Background

The contribution of forests to the life of the communities and the government, and as a means for mitigating and adapting to climate change are amongst the concerns in the current environmental conservation debates. Despite the supply of

wood and non-wood products, forests offer employment, they are a source of revenue through sale of wood and non-wood products and services, help in soil conservation and serve other human uses. The current global and national concerns are expanded to how effectively forests can be managed because they are seen as the cheapest way of mitigating climate change through sequestering carbon (URT, 2009; UNREDD, 2008).

Nationally, in the Tanzania's conservation history, the government has been protecting and preserving forest as a means of wildlife conservation. The purpose of conservation at independence and thereafter was not because of the intrinsic value but because of the instrumental value attached to forests: income and foreign exchange (Neumann, 1995; 1998).

The approach of conservation after independence was to a large extent a top-down approach (Neumann, 1998). This nationalistic top-down approach to conservation faced a lot of resistance as communities perceived and valued land and forests as their means of survival. The majority of rural communities in Tanzania depend heavily on forests and forest products as a source of bio-energy (firewood and charcoal), medicine, soil protection and agriculture. This dependence on forests and forest products even to-date collides with the Government's goal of conservation (Yanda, 2012).

Deforestation in Tanzania was estimated at 412,000 ha per annum between 1990 and 2005. The Government holds the main causes of deforestation to be population growth, poverty, policy inadequacies and market failure. Furthermore, they also point to causes such as agriculture, overgrazing, wildlife, charcoal making, wood fuel and lack of efficient production and marketing, over-exploitation of wood resources, lack of land use plans and lack of adherence to existing ones (URT, 2009).

Several initiatives have been taken by the Government of Tanzania and non-governmental actors to improve the management of forests and forest resources. These initiatives were partly done because the perception (by professionals and academics) about forests has changed from wood production to valuing it for its non-wood importance and a range of the environmental and other services that it provides (Petersen & Sand hovel 2001). Policies on land and forest management were reviewed with the aim of decentralizing forests management and making it participatory. The policies provided for the Government as the owner of the land, taking care of it on behalf of the people.

Amidst these efforts, deforestation continued to persist until the Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) Projects came in as a new strategy which is not only aimed at addressing deforestation sustainably but also carbon sequestration. Tanzania was considered by UN to be one of the countries where REDD could be implemented because it is ranked as the fourth among the most deforested countries in the world and the available participatory institutional framework: Participatory Forest Management (PFM) that is the Joint Forest Management (JFM) and Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) seen as an entry point to the Project (Faida & Eliamani, 2010).

Tanzania is currently receiving funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Norwegian embassy in Dar es Salaam to implement nine REDD pilot projects in specific parts of Tanzania (Burgess *et al*, 2010). This implies that a lot of activities related to forests and reduction of carbon emissions are taking place from national to grass-roots levels. With this intervention, I wanted to explore the roles of key stakeholders particularly villagers in the pilot phase and how at the project level villagers comply with the roles assigned to them by project donor and facilitator.

Therefore, this study was basically on exploration of roles assigned to villagers, and the way villagers comply with the specified roles by the Norwegian Government and the African Wild Life Foundation.

1.2 REDD and REDD+ Project in Tanzania

1.2.1 REDD and REDD+

i. REDD

The acronym stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation. Klepsvik (2012) holds that “REDD is an effort to create financial value for the carbon stored in the forests”. The system of payment would involve carbon tradeoff, or repaying for forest conservation. REDD strategy is believed to be a win-win strategy which not only emphasizes forest conservation (for reducing emissions) through land use management for a sustainable forest management but it also contributes to poverty reduction in the communities participating. Kanchan (2011) holds that, REDD promises to address other social and economic aspects such as improvement of alternative livelihood issues, bring other profits from the preserved areas, and other ecological services. Consequently, REDD is seen as a successful way whereby forest-neighboring communities are sustainably managing their forests while benefiting from their contribution to CO₂ emissions reduction.

Adopted by United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) countries during the 13th Conference of Parties in Bali, Indonesia, REDD is expected to contribute to both communities living near the forest reserve as well as attaining the goal of forest conservation for the purpose of reducing emissions (URT, 2013). As cited from different literatures, REDD is an ambitious international climate resolution mechanism that attempts globally to reward developing countries. By implementing policies and programs aimed at reducing deforestation and forest degradation for the purpose of sustaining and

improving forest carbon stocks and sinks. Countries under REDD will be compensated. Additionally, REDD brings in place a new strategy of reducing CO₂ emissions by paying for activities that avoid forest loss or degradation (UNREDD, 2009; Kanchan, 2011).


Ximena and Alvarado suggest that climate change is real and its effects are seen not only in human life but also in natural entity. Early mitigation is necessary in addressing climate change, as it seems to be cheaper compared to addressing its future consequences if left unattended. The mitigation strategy that was given priority was from afforestation and reforestation simply because forests can act as carbon sinks (which also can mitigate climate change). However, later on the focus was extended to stress on avoided deforestation where communities participating will be compensated (Ximena and Alvarado, 2007). Parallel to this thinking, the Tanzania National REDD Strategy affirm that, it was from this rationale whereby Reduction of Emission from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) was formulated (United Republic of Tanzania, 2013).

As noted by Hufty and Haakenstan (2011) and UN-REDD (2009), deforestation share in greenhouse gases emitted sector wise is estimated to be about 17 % of the total greenhouse gases emitted globally. However, when managed well forests may absorb and store 50% of the organic carbon. If REDD is successful that will be the amount of CO₂ estimated to be stored. After this success, the countries participating in REDD+ will be compensated as they are providing an environmental service of reducing CO₂.

IPCC (2007) presents the percentage of the green house gases emission from different sectors forestry inclusive. In their summary, the energy sector produces 25.9%, industry 19.4%, forestry 17.4%, agriculture 13.5%, transport 13.1%, while

residential sector produces 7.9% while waste emits 2.8% of GHG. Figure 1.1 below is the presentation of emission per sector as adapted from IPCC.


Figure 1.1: Percentage of GHG emissions by industrial sector



Source: IPCC 2007

From the above depiction, it entails that the emission of carbon dioxide gases comes not only from deforestation and forest degradation but highly from the daily energy production and consumption behaviors as well as other sectors. Since the beginning of industrial revolution (1850s) the increased use of fossil fuels such as coal, petroleum, and natural gas has accelerated the global climate change despite the fact that the world's climate has always varied naturally. Whenever fossil fuels are burned, a significant amount of Green House Gas (GHG) is produced in massive amounts and endures in the atmosphere for a long time, which exhausts the Ozone layer than other gases such as Methane, Chlorofluorocarbons and Nitrogen oxides. These gases had been stipulated in percentage by IPCC (2007) in a pie chart below: -

Figure 1.2: Presentation Emission Percentage by Gas Type.



Source: Source: IPCC, 2007

ii. REDD+

Inferring to the discussion by Kanchan (2011), REDD+ was formulated at the Conference of Parties 14th (COP 14) of 2008 in Poznan, Poland and it was further discussed in the 15th Conference of Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009. The Copenhagen Accord was also formed in the COP 15, which among other things it recognizes REDD+ as a strategy for reducing CO₂ emission from deforestation and forest degradation and brought a platform for fund mobilization for REDD+. As per UN-REDD (2009) the major focus of REDD+ is not only on payments for prevented deforestation and forest degradation but also on other activities including stopping forest fires, amendment in logging activities, and other activities of forest management. Kanchan summarizes that, "...it is necessary to address and acknowledge the carbon stock enhancement and sustainable forest management practices besides activities addressing deforestation and forest degradation..." (Kanchan 2011:23).

From the UN-REDD portrayal, REDD+ “...goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation and include the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks...” in developing countries (Klepsvik ibid p.1). REDD+ bring both new opportunities and new challenges to communities in managing forests. It deals with issues of deforestation and forest degradation while putting into consideration local livelihood issues as a way of dealing with rural poverty (UN-REDD 2009).

Since adoption of REDD and REDD+ there have been several negotiations by member-states regarding on how the REDD mechanism will be implemented. Issues of carbon measurement and carbon assessment methodology, payment system and many others are under discussion so as to open the way for a better future REDD and REDD+.

However, there are many issues to be settled under REDD and REDD+ such as issues of payment mechanism, form of funding, how to monitor emissions, how to meet local social needs while attaining the goal of reduced emission and the baseline for emission level. Negotiations are still in place on how to address some of the challenging issues, hopeful through negotiations, actors will reach a state where all the basic issues for REDD institutionalization will be settled.

iii. REDD+ Payments

According to the UNFCCC (2007), it is the responsibility of developed countries to incur the monetary expenses in reducing emissions because they are the one with bigger shares of carbon emitted compared to the developing countries. In 2008, developed Nations initiated the post 2012 Carbon Credit Fund amounted euro 125 million for REDD+ programmes. A coalition of Developed Nations made further promise of disbursing USD 4.5 billion dollars purposely for REDD+ activities by 2012. Moreover, the coalition estimated that global financial flows

for GHG reductions could reach up to US 30 billion dollars per year (UNREDD 2009). If fulfilled accordingly, this is an opportunity for developing countries like Tanzania to help their rural communities in poverty alleviation. This is because communities surrounding the forest are not only vulnerable to climate change impacts but they are the one who bear the direct costs of forest management and so they should benefit from the fruits of their conservation efforts.

Future REDD+ will highly depend on the funding from the carbon credit. However, the carbon credit is highly dependent on the global economic conditions. To engender enduring monetary flows for the REDD+ payments after the pilot time would be contingent on the reliability of the carbon market, which would also depend on the constancy of demand and supply of carbon credits. However, the current global financial crisis had also disturbed the demand and price of carbon.

Concerning the payment options, UNFCCC countries agreed on two payment options concerning the REDD+ payment mechanism namely market and non-market mechanism. In the market-based mechanism the private sectors in developed countries are allowed to buy REDD+ carbon offset credits while in a non-market mechanism developing countries are supposed to receive REDD+ funding from international multilateral public fund under the UNFCCC basing on outcomes or efforts achieved. In this payment type developing country would claim funding from the International Multilateral Public Fund for the reduced emissions in a certain periods of time in the accomplishment of REDD+ activities. This mechanism (non-market) necessitates for the presence of the governments of the developing nations to supervise all the activities of REDD+ performed by a certain country in a given time (Taccon and Irawan, 2009). Tanzania has opted for the second option (non-market mechanism) for her REDD+ pilot phase.

1.2.2 REDD+ Implementation in Tanzania

According to various literatures, internationally, REDD implementation in Tanzania is rationalized by; Tanzania being amongst tropical countries with big forest cover of tropical forests which are good in carbon storage (Burges et al 2010), availability of a favorable institutional setup that promotes local people participation particularly participatory forest management, presence of land tenure systems which provides village land under the mandate of villagers (Bartholdson et al, 2012; Faida and Eliamani 2010) and lastly, Tanzania is facing an increased danger of deforestation and forest degradation rate, which necessitates a call for an action (Yanda, 2012). It was behind these major reasons that Tanzania was considered qualified for REDD implementation.

Concerning the danger of rapid deforestation and degradation rate, Yanda (2012) presents rapid population growth to be the major driver of deforestation in Tanzania. Population growth puts pressure on forests as a way of getting biofuel. The Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimates that, Tanzania had 44,928,923 citizens by 2012 (NBS 2012), 90% of whom depend on biofuel as their major source of energy. Additionally, 50% of Tanzanians live below the poverty line, which makes it difficult for them to meet the costs of substituting fuel wood with other sustainable sources like solar energy that are costly. Likewise, inadequate technology is among the issues that contribute to deforestation (URT 2005).


The REDD+ pilot phase implementation in Tanzania is highly financed by the Norwegian Government under special agreement with the Tanzanian Government. In 2008 the Government of Norway decided to support pilot projects in Tanzania under its International Climate and Forest Initiative (ICFI). This support forms the basis for local level capacity building, development of the

national REDD strategy and implementation. This support would form the basis for future REDD in the country. Furthermore, the partnership was not only based on natural resources but in agricultural sector too (Nordeco 2013).

In order to qualify for REDD+ funding, Tanzania was supposed to identify a REDD+ task force and establish a country's REDD+ strategy and program that identified institutional issues and coordination of REDD at all levels, awareness creation and communication for REDD, local capacity building, and networking. The strategy explicitly identified the roles, principles and responsibilities to be accomplished by all stakeholders involved in the project until the money is channeled.

For illustrations, the Monitoring matters organization (2012) provides for a three-pronged structure of REDD implementation in Tanzania namely: at the national level, international and at the ground level. These operators work together in a circle. At the national level, the carbon will be measured, analyzed and verified. After the verification process, the international level will disburse the money. The money is anticipated to benefit the communities who will spend it according to their development priorities. The Ministry of Natural Resources will supervise all the activities together with the local authorities for transparency and accountability purposes. At the local level, the authorities will do reporting and monitoring. They will also send the feedback to the Ministry and later on to the International level again. Figure 1.3 summarizes the structure from the Tanzania National REDD.

Figure 1.3: Proposed National Structure of REDD+ Implementation in Tanzania (termed the REDD+ production chain).



SOURCE: www.monitoringmatters.org

According to the Nordeco mid-term review (2013), the implementation of REDD+ in Tanzania has reached to its second phase. The first phase commenced on March 2009 to April 2011 in which USD 2.4 millions were channeled. Key deliverables were: REDD task force establishment, installing REDD pilot projects, communicating and awareness creation for REDD+, and the development of the national REDD strategy.

The second phase of implementation started in October 2011 whereby the amount of USD 4.49 millions was directed for the purpose of extending phase one outcome, which was highly on support. The time frame for this phase was 24 months.

However, despite the presence of this partnership the Norwegian government through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not pleased to enter into partnership with the Tanzanian government concerning direct implementation of the REDD pilot phase because of its corruption scandal of the 1990's until 2006 involving Tanzania's environmental sector. Instead, the Norwegian government decided to enter into partnership with the NGOs for implementing nine REDD pilot projects in Tanzania as facilitators and not the government. (Bartholdson *et al*, 2012).

i. REDD+ in the Kolo Hills

The African Wildlife Foundation entered into partnership with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for implementation of REDD in the Kolo Hills Kondoa district. The Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania called for proposals for REDD pilot projects, and AWF qualified to be among those who got the funding. AWF was interested in the Kolo Hills because it is along its "heartlands" and so conserving it would directly impact the Tarangire River, which is the source of water for wildlife in the Tarangire national park. The project is named Advancing REDD in the Kolo Hills Forests (ARKFor) in which the main goal is;

“to contribute to the poverty reduction and climate change mitigation by enhancing Tanzania's capacity to use REDD as a mechanism for rural communities to reap tangible benefits from improved forest management and conservation” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009)

REDD+ pilot project in the Kolo Hills is under facilitation of the AWF for four (4) years now since December 2010 until 2013. AWF's interests in Kolo was based on

its aim to secure Tarangire River which is the water source for the wildlife in the park. In the study of the Kolo Hills project, Batholdson et al (2012) found that 56,000 ha of forests in the Kolo Hills are under AWF REDD facilitation.

From the AWF perspective ARKFor Project is designed to address degradation through promotion of alternative sources of livelihood, to market and sell carbon for the purpose of serving communities and conservation, to encourage proper land use management, to build the capacity of REDD stakeholders at the local and national level and to share information and networking of improvement of conservation issues (AWF, 2012).

From the AWF justifications, previous conservation projects in Kondoia such as HADO (Land rehabilitation program in Dodoma Region) were centralized with inadequate citizens' participation and so there was less local ownership in these projects. REDD+ in the Kolo Hills is said to be participatory and involving local stakeholders in its activities and programs. However, on the ground there are several issues to be addressed so as to ensure full participation of the villagers in the REDD Project. AWF argues that, local people empowerment especially in decision making is among the strategy to ensure true participation of villagers in REDD project (AWF, *op cit*).

1.3 Research Questions

This study was guided by three research questions namely;

1. What are the roles that the African Wildlife Foundation and donors expect villagers to take in the pilot project for REDD at Kolo Hills?
2. To what extent the villagers agree and comply with the roles assigned to them in the REDD pilot project?
3. How do issues of role compliance and in compliance can be explained?

1.4 Rationale for the study

Exploration of stakeholders' roles in the REDD pilot project cannot be ignored for the aim of gathering valuable information and lessons in the pilot phase. The centrality of stakeholders who are directly or indirectly affected by development projects has been a global concern. This emphasis is grounded on the theoretical underpinning that planning and policy processes are pluralistic in nature and no single organization or individual can exert direct control over the destination of development process (Jamal & Getz, 1995; Reed, 1997).

Schumacher (1973) argues that development does not start with physical goods but with people and their education, organization and discipline, and if it excludes the people, all resources will remain latent and untapped potential. He emphasizes decentralization in decision-making and the centrality of people (key stakeholders) to any kind of development process. It is from this theoretical grounds that I found it convincing to conduct the study on the villagers' roles under REDD and how they perceive and take up the roles.

Furthermore, conducting research on roles in REDD issues became my interest following the lecture series at the Center for Development and the Environment (SUM) of the University of Oslo. I found knowledge gathering on roles accomplished under REDD to be something very important for the future REDD Project. In its pilot phase there is a lot to learn and adjust so as to prepare all stakeholders for the overall project implementation. Basing on the fact that REDD Project is implemented in Tanzania it was easier for me to go and find out the roles and compliance in fulfilling the goals of sustainable forest conservation on the villagers' side in this pilot project.

Another reason for conducting my study on REDD roles in the Kolo Hills was my attachment to the Climate Change Impacts Adaptation and Mitigation (CCIAM)

projects as young professional. I had to research from the same case study (Kolo Hills), which was targeted by the project. I was involved in this project not only as part of the team but also I received the fieldwork support from CCIAM. The mega research project in the Kolo Hills was on land issues and livelihoods.

Significantly, soliciting villagers' roles is essential as it helps in identifying best practices and successes stories from what have been done so that they may be included in future REDD negotiations and be promoted in implementation of other REDD projects after the pilot phase.

1.5 Significance of the Study

REDD+ should not just be concerned with forests and reduced emission; it should be concerned with local people and their surroundings, right to property, livelihood and their role in decision making of the issues affecting their wellbeing in their respective contexts. This study has provided; on one hand the comprehensive analysis of the local communities' roles as specified by the project donor and the facilitator and on another hand the extent to which villagers agree and comply with these roles ascribed. This research work has enlightened the AWF and the donor on what is real happening on the ground and so to develop an action plan to make things right where they are not right. This is specifically on the role of citizens who are the primary implementer and beneficiaries of the project.

Because it is a pilot period of the REDD+ projects, the findings from this study will help the project designers and the government of Tanzania to get a clear picture of the communities' readiness towards REDD+ particularly on roles identified to them. This clear picture will guide the REDD designers to come up with the concrete strategies, policies and laws concerning REDD+, and how well it would be implemented.

Educationally, this is an important requirement for the fulfillment of the Master of Philosophy (Culture Environment and Sustainability) thesis of the University of Oslo.

1.6 Thesis Structure and Interdisciplinary

This work is organized into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction whereby; REDD and REDD+ concepts were discussed as well as the REDD+ project in Tanzania and Kolo Hills. In addition, the rationale to the choice of the topic, and the significance of the study were also presented. Lastly, research questions, and the limitations to the study followed.

The second chapter is the presentation of theoretical issues, literature review regarding people's role in the conservation field overtime. Local development tradition, development aid and the conceptual framework sum-up this chapter.

Research methodology is presented in the third chapter. Specifically, this chapter enlightens the reader on the research design and approach, population and sampling issues, research instruments for data collection and data analysis procedures.

Chapter four and five is the finding presentation and discussion while chapter six presents the summary, conclusion and recommendation.

This study took the direction of sociological roles presentation as well as aspects of political ecology in explaining how villagers take the roles assigned to them in the conservation paradigm.

1.7 Limitations and Reflections

Masters research projects cannot be completely devoid of subjectivities and limitations. There have been some conditions under which the research process has been underpinned with difficulties and limitations. These include the following:

Being a Tanzanian may have affected the objectivity of the whole research process, including the data collection and analysis processes. This is because researching in my own community would get me immersed into it, at any point in time, as a member of the community thereby losing the objective lens of perceiving the issues. However, I tried to remain neutral and objective to the reality.

Furthermore, staying in the field over a long period of time could create the danger of going native. The researcher, having been staying in the research area over a long period, might get her identifying with the people and hence becoming sympathetic to the cause of the people. If such occurs, the objectivity of the researcher fades. To ensure this did not affect my research work, I had to keep on reflecting on the research purpose, my role as a researcher and its effect to the research process.

Also, in some areas, villagers feared their relationship with leaders might be strained especially if their responses do not go in favour of their superiors. Therefore, for the fear of intimidation in some cases, they were refusing to respond by telling the researcher to direct the questions to their leaders. On the other hand, respondents might have given incorrect responses in order to satisfy the whims and caprices of their superiors.

Moreover, in some cases, villagers were hoping that the researcher had the authority to punish those in charge of the project for not keeping to their promises. Therefore, their responses were skewed towards that direction. In situations like this, the researcher did all efforts to explain the purpose of the research.

Time constraint was also seen as one factor that affected the process of data collection. Having more than 90 interviews was too much to handle within the stipulated time. This was also due to my attachment to the CCIAM projects where I was supposed to have a long stay in the field by visiting more than 10 villages. Striking the required acquaintance with the villagers in order to court their trust and confidentiality for the right responses was also affected by the limited time.

Finally, concentrating on a single case for this research was a limiting factor to generalizing the findings. Other cases need to be studied and compared in order to draw a more generalized inferences about peoples roles and their levels of compliance in REDD projects.

2: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

In the first chapter I presented the research questions and the introduction of REDD+ project in Tanzania. In this chapter I present the theory that I will apply to address the research questions. First I define 'role' which is a central concept for my study. Then, the literature on villagers' roles in conservation, rural development and development aid projects will follow. The presentation in this chapter will contribute in answering research questions one and two on REDD+ roles and compliance as well as research question three.

2.1 Role Theory

The term role is subject to different definitions depending on the context, who defines it, when and the purpose of the definition. I will begin with presenting a few different definitions of role. For example The Encyclopedia Britannica online defines role as

“A comprehensive pattern of behavior that is socially recognize, providing a means of identifying and placing an individual in a society. It also serves as a strategy for coping with recurrent situations and dealing with the roles of others”.

Key terms in this definition concerning roles are; patterned behaviors, social recognition, role as a source of identity and placement.

On the other side, Christiansen and Baum (1991:857 Referred in Mathiowetz 1992) define roles as sets of connected behaviors that have some socially agreed functions and for which there is an accepted code of norms. This view also pinpoint role as linked behaviors. Also, it conveys that, for a role to be performed there must be agreements and shared principles regarding how they should be

performed. Furthermore, it portrays that, when people in the society perform different roles they participate in accomplishing societal goals and objectives. Biddle, (1986) apprehend role as a set of connected behaviors, rights and obligations as comprehended by actors in a social situation. These behaviors, rights and obligations are defined according to the context in ways that seem to be meaningful to the people. This also implies that the goals set by them to guide behaviors usually correlates to what appeals to them. In the same line Lemay (1999) argues that, on daily basis, role comprises conceptualization of behavior and rules in a particular context whereby these rules can be judged as positive or negative. While Stebbins (1967), deviate from perceiving roles as patterns of behaviors simply because behaviors are complex and if they are to form roles then there would be varieties or roles but not patterned and shared. Instead, Stebbins (*op cit*) relates roles to rights and obligations that surround a status or position.

Biddle (1979) suggests the following key features of roles in the society; roles present social arrangement, have an outer (observable) and inner (personal) perspective, communicate people as role partners, that role goes hand in hand with expectations whereby the other role performers and society at large expects the actor to behave in certain ways, that behaviors which come out of the roles performed are referred as positive or negative, and that context or environment sustain and bound role behavior. That is to say people behave in certain ways because they are obliged to do so by the contexts they are in. On the other side, Stebbins (1967) offers contexts and settings, presence of others, purpose, role identities, expectation interpretation, and behavior influence as the basic complexions that roles take.

Focusing the attention into the above definitions by Biddle (1979); (1986), Lemay (1999), Christiansen and Baum (1991) Stebbins (1967) and the Encyclopedia

Britannica, one can notice that, all definitions associates the role concept with specific behaviors that limit role performers, these behaviors assure the individuals' status in the society and determines the individuals' ability to associate with other role performers. Also, roles are situated and vary according to the contexts. It is this standpoint that will be referred throughout this study whenever the word role is mentioned.

Biddle points the origin of role theory from the works of renowned scholars such as Georg Simmel, George Herbert Mead, Ralph Linton and Jacob Moreno. There have been further developments from what these scholars founded especially from perceiving roles as identified behaviors to involve other issues of status and social context. Role theory is best explained in the models of symbolic interactionism, functional, structural, organizational, and cognitive role theory. Major aspects addressed within the role theory are; "consensus, conformity, role conflict and role taking". These key concepts will be discussed explicitly or implicitly as this theory is discussed (Biddle 1986:67).

This study takes Stebbins (1967)'s definition that relates roles to rights and obligations that surround a status or position.

2.1.2 Key assumptions of the Role Theory

The role theory is centered on human beings who are the individual social actors to take up roles whether achieved or ascribed. The theory entails and preoccupied by clarifying what people do and the reason for doing so, and what they expect others to do in relation to available societal values and norms. In reality of life, this theory systematically explain and reflect how daily life is organized and how actors who are the role performers live their life. In a broad-spectrum, role theory deals with how people organize themselves in their daily life, how they perceive

themselves and perceived by others (Biddle 1979; 1986). The following are specific assumption;

i. Achieved and Ascribed Roles

In the society roles may be voluntarily acquired by individuals or imposed by external actor outside individuals. When actors voluntarily presumes roles basing on their own abilities, skills and strengths they are executing ascribed' roles where as, if people execute roles assigned to them by other people beyond their control they are in the process of accomplishing 'ascribed roles' (Rodney, 2007). When people accept to take roles imposed on them, they calculate what they get in return by accomplishing the imposed roles. In cases where expectations are not met protest may occur and other things like withdrawal and pretending to take part while not, striking or the use of any other means which would express their desires. Biddle (1979), (1986) and Lemay (1999) agree with each other that, when roles are imposed adaptation is necessary so as to adjust to new changes. Stress may be experienced particularly when the changes are imposed rather than chosen.

ii. Role and Expectations

Role performers have expectations of what they get back for their engagement in different roles. They are also expected to present certain behaviors to justify their status as societal role performers. Role expectations are both on action and qualities. This presupposes not only expectations to accomplish and act in a certain way but also to live the role qualities. These qualities are embedded in the role and so the role performer automatically dresses them in the process of performing the respective role. Role expectation is in both ascribed and achieved roles.

iii. Roles as guided by Societal Values, Norms, Demands and Rules

Individuals take up different positions that are shaped by social norms, demands, and rules particularly in achieved type of role performance. These demands and rules are expectations that are shared, and the actor performing the role is expected to adhere to so as to accomplish the requirement needed to fulfill the roles. Some requirements are well defined in the society to position holders but others are not well defined. Individuals incur costs to conform to role norms and those who violate them face punishment (Lemay 1999).

iv. Role Performance and Conflict

The way actors interpret and perceive themselves and each other may lead to a conflict or harmonious relationship hence affecting role performance. With a harmonious, good, peaceful and equal relationship, trust is ensured and so the social roles may be performed effectively. It is believed and suggested that people agree to information more willingly from the people they trust. Lack of local trust can limit the success of various activities even if they were designed for the benefit of the people themselves (Biddle, 1986).

For the purpose of this study, the concepts of ascribed and achieved roles will be used in addressing the research questions. This is because in most development projects most of the roles to be performed by villagers come with the projects; this means they are ascribed rather than achieved, as it is not the villagers who sit and determine what they really need to perform in order to meet the project goals. Villagers, in the process of fulfilling the imposed roles, expect the role provider to provide them with certain things as a motivation. Therefore, the success or failure of the planned action depends on how far the expectation will be met.

Moreover, when roles are imposed on individuals, they do not necessarily conform to the provided code of conduct that guide their roles as there will be

few people who may violate them and find their own ways of living and behaving both in small and large groups. This variation happens because in most cases a role expectation in its outer and inner sides is guided by norms, beliefs and preferences that are learned but not necessarily shared but are highly influencing individual actors' behavior.

2.2 The Roles of Villagers in Literature on Conservation

The role of villagers in the conservation field has varied overtime following shifts on how nature has been perceived and debated. In all three phases villagers' roles have been imposed by external agencies but not coming from within; meaning that, it is not villagers who determined how they would like to interact with nature but the authorities responsible for conservation. Therefore, in all stages of conservation roles assigned to villagers were ascribed rather than achieved roles.

In the first phase, human beings were perceived as unfriendly to nature and so they were put aside and far from reserved and protected areas. This was a fortress style of conservation. The second paradigm is a win-win discourse which insists on the importance of human involvement in nature conservation following the realization of the negative implication resulting from separating human beings from other natural entity especially wildlife. It is the second model that dominates most of our current nature debates and policies. The third discourse is the critical analysis that puts clear the practice of today's win-win style of nature conservation. Human rights activists and local/indigenous people immediately bordering the protected areas support this (Adams and Mulligan, 2003; Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010; Jones, 2006). A detailed description of people's roles in all the paradigms is discussed below.

2.2.1 Fortress Conservation

In the fortress style of conservation villagers were ignored and mistreated. They did not have specific roles. This conservation style dominated from the end of 19th century during park establishment, protected areas were untouched and protected by the army, and seen to be a wilderness in which human disturbances were not allowed. The literature portrays the centralization of all the key roles and decisions concerning conservation under the state authorities and big NGOs. These were same actors that supported this view of conservation (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010).

Jones (2006:184) for example elucidates that in this era nature was seen as untouchable wilderness that is independent from humans, and the state controlled and managed the environment by eliminating human interactions nearby reserved areas because “the local people were seen as threats to forests and wild life”. This model of conservation has been known as ‘protectionism’, ‘fortress conservation’ and ‘the fences and fines approach’ to nature. Many conservation plans and policies at this time were seen as top-down.

Benjaminsen and Svarstad (*op cit*) in the discussion of conservation practices they provide Yellowstone Park under the best example of the national park that was established during the 19th century under the fortress style. They argue that indigenous people were expelled from their areas to leave the park. Only tourism activities were allowed for those who would afford to pay, and these were white and rich people.

In addition to the fortress debate, Adams and Hutton (2007:148) reveal that, since colonialism there has been a problem of people displacement during the creation of protected areas which has been documented overtime since the first establishment of parks in the 19th century and further expansions (during

conservation boom) in Africa. Disregarding people's role and participation in nature made different scholars and other actors ask questions like; "for whom protected areas are put aside? On whose authority and at whose costs?". These questions resulted into a shift to the second nature conservation style that aims at integrating humans into processes of conservation.

2.2.2 Win-win Conservation Style

Through a win-win conservation style villagers are assigned roles, and are supposed to take part in conservation and become partners. It is a form of ascribed role type. In return villagers expect benefits in both economic and social terms. As discussed by Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010), a win-win juncture came in the late 1980's with emphasis on participation of people who live in and nearby the protected areas, benefit sharing and compensating local people in case they are affected by conservation programmes specifically in protected areas establishment. The win-win discourse was a result of the Brundtland report of 1987 concerning the common future, pressure from different actors such as right activists, influences of the decentralization wind world-wide, and neo-liberalism influences.

Both Adams and Hutton (2007) and Jones (2006) argue in the same line that, historically, the recognition of social impacts of protected areas on the surrounding population was extensively begun in the 1970's (as a result of a shift to the second paradigm in nature conservation). The motive behind was still to have conservation programmes that are more inclusive and participatory both in economic and social terms.

In this paradigm there has been theoretical emphasis on a greater resilience of African environment and for rural people to interact with nature constructively. In the same way, there have been concerns of involving local people in taking part in the day-to-day conservations under the available local institutional set-up

although the nature of participation practice is also questionable. It is during this time when the attention is shifted to a more participatory and community oriented conservation, emphasizing the validity of indigenous' knowledge likewise to that of experts, indigenous rights to ecological resources, and benefit redistribution in a more equitable way (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010).

As Neuman (2009) provides, the centrality of people and their involvement in nature conservation becomes a topic of interest and importance because ecological predicaments are linked to social issues surrounding conservation and so they needed not only technical grounds but also a theoretical base to examine socio-economic and political relations so as to be able to comprehend well their complexities.

As examined by Adam and Hutton (2007) and Walker (2005), the manner in which people relate to nature specifically in the framework of protected areas is political in nature as it involves issues of resource distribution and access, state's responsibility, and other intellectual power in understanding nature. Also the way nature is understood has political significance since it deals with who gets what, when, where, and how'. Therefore, people should be given the central role on determining how well nature should be well conserved and benefits from what comes out of nature.

There were different efforts made which discouraged bypassing humans in nature conservation. For example, in the 1980s, the International Union for Conservation of Nature general assembly issued a decree emphasizing on people inclusion and protection of traditional life and heritage telling all the governments to stop displacing people under the reason of protected areas creation. Further advancements were made in 1984 when the World Bank announced further guidelines on which barred relocation of local people from their native areas. As the result, by 1980's many conservation models and policies begun to

accommodate social needs of indigenous people and so ‘it facilitated a shift from social exclusion to social inclusion’.

Moreover, the issue of local/indigenous people role as right recipients is one of the key focuses in this discourse. For a long time they were bypassed by conservation plans, and programs of their respective areas. These concerns began in the 1980’s in Australia and Canada where issues of indigenous “land title and resource rights” in conservation were brought in the debate and later on they spread all over the world (Adams and Hutton *opcit*). There was a call to put human beings as partners in conservation so as it would be possible to observe their rights.

Other conventions on indigenous rights are found in the ILO Convention Number 169 Article 26, which calls member state to protect and recognize the rights to the land, territories, and other resources owned, occupied, used or acquired traditionally by indigenous/local people. This means that, in any project initiated local people’s role should be central in determining how it should be implemented, their benefits and other important issue as they have the right to their resources, land, and traditional inheritance (ILO 1991).

Apart from those conventions there have been live events to discuss issues of local people rights in nature conservation. One of the cited occasions is the World Parks Congress of 2003 in Durban whereby 120 indigenous people, NGOs and other key environmental actors attended. Specific theme of the congress was on local people’s rights, equity in relation to protected areas. The outcome of this conference was realization and provision of the observance of the rights of both mobile indigenous people and local communities in natural resource and biodiversity conservation (World Conservation Union 2005 cited by Adams and Hutton 2007). Further achievements have been witnessed in the recent 2008

United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Indigenous People that explicitly provides how the local people should be approached when asking them to take part into projects and before relocating them.

Incidences of dispersing local people's roles in conservation without considering their rights has brought impacts to their livelihood hence impoverishment, and the violation of the right to own property and other freedoms. It is a call to all actors to change their perception from perceiving human as destructors of nature and believe that human has equal value and they are part of nature. This approach is believed as one of the best ways to avoid coercion to local people (Walker, 2005).

i. A win-win Style Associated with Sustainable Resource use

Concerns for sustainable resource use came in the 1990's as a way of meeting both the human needs as well as the goal of sustainable environmental conservation. In this human's role was supposed to be that of nature extraction while considering the needs of the future generation. These ideas replaced the destruction approach to nature (Hulme and Murphree, 2001). It is believed that, sustainable development would be achieved when conservation is accompanied by sustainable resource use of living entity and ecosystems.

Propagators of 'sustainable use' believe that,

“it is only when the indigenous people are given direct economic part, interests and benefits to the species protected the sustainable conservation and development can be achieved. It is when their livelihood is secured the conservation process would succeed” (Adams and Hutton 2007:151).

The idea of sustainable use became a key reason for funding in conservation arena during 1990's by several development agents including the USAID. It is still taken as a condition for financing even to date.

Moreover, through sustainable use, local people can still use resources such as timber, medicinal products, bee production, vegetable, fruits, firewood, poles, thatching grasses, and other available stuffs for their wellbeing as agreed in the village meetings.

ii. A Win-Win Conservation and Poverty Reduction

Apart from just pushing the changing of roles of local people from destructors to partner of nature, stakeholders have also put in place aspects of poverty reduction as something which should go hand in hand with local people involvement in nature conservation. Poverty reduction is being mainstreamed in conservation through a win-win strategy. It is proposed that, a win-win strategy should be put in conservation plans and actions so as to attain the goal of poverty reduction while achieving another goal of environment sustainability. Poverty reduction and conservation should go simultaneously.

As a way of handling conservation and poverty reduction in a simultaneously way, the aspect of Payment for Ecological Services (PES) and other income generating activities are now emphasized. One of the best ways to PES is tourism in which people pay so as to access the well-protected nature for the purpose of generating income and employment to locals. However, not all the local people can afford to pay the fees for accessing reserves but also there have been reported cases of inequitable distribution of the PES benefits hence local dissatisfactions.

For the past three decades conservation projects has created the so-called conservation sufferers and evacuee by extending the poverty level among the neighboring communities. Adams and Hutton in their discussion of people, park and poverty found that, conservation projects have created burden and more pains to the locals other than what it was expected to bring, it has

created“...landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, economic marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property services and social disarticulation...” (Adam and Hutton 2007:164). They add that, “...biodiversity conservation should reduce poverty...help alleviate hunger and poverty, promote good human health and be the basis for ensuring freedom and equity for all”. They advocate for a new approach to protected areas that will prioritize local people’s role and accommodate local people’s needs so as to help to alleviate poverty. This is due to the rationale that protected areas save as the source of livelihood to the poor.

A number of criticisms have been directed against this approach basically on the side of the actual benefits, benefit distribution, and the institutional set up of park administration which not only marginalize the people but also it does not directly include the local populations. The following are views of different scholars in regard to criticisms;

The first critique is from Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010:385) in their analysis of conservation discourses in competition with practices in Africa. They depict that instead of devolving the powers and responsibilities to the locals in Tanzania, current conservation practices by both NGOs and state authorities has resulted into ‘recentralization’ and “economic marginalization instead of poverty reduction” because the benefits they get from the protected areas is less than the cost they normally incur. In most cases leaders and elites are not willing to decentralize everything concerning natural resource especially when they find that they have stake in the issue at place.

In addition, Jones (2006) and Adams and Hutton (2007) puts clear that despite the fact that those who bear the costs of conservation in the protected areas are locals, there have been reported cases of low benefits accrued from the schemes.

Moreover, there has been a reported inequity in distribution whereas local elites have more benefits than others in most instances. Corruption conducts are also coming in especially from unethical staffs when people seek for permits to access those products. Therefore, it is still debatable whether the win-win style of conservation would really help in poverty reduction of the nearby communities in the protected areas.

Paradoxically, in most of the countries to date there are places where incidents of obligatory local people displacement, removals and injustice are happening despite all the efforts advocating for the observance of the rights of the indigenous people and reducing poverty. Needs, rights, and interests of the people are bypassed to the extent that parks and all the species protected are more worthy than human beings surrounding the protected areas. Under this situation it is paradoxical how this type of conservation that bypasses the locals would result into poverty reduction. Jones confers the following for a successful conservation;

“...Global and local are clearly intertwined, unless local values are accommodated, international values and goals will be subverted by local responses...tensions (will) continue to exist, given that local incentives indicate devolution of proprietorship, while the international-level bureaucratic and technocratic mind upholds the centralization of authority and regards devolution as the surrendering of professional management to unsophisticated peasants” (Jones 2006:491).

In the light of above discussion, it is well defined that, conservation authorities have mostly determined villagers' roles in conservation. This entails for ascribed roles in conservation rather than achieved roles (in which roles originates from within villagers). In the fortress style, although there was nothing specific done by villagers, they were ordered to stay aside the reserves. It was not their will to be away but all the regulations about their interactions with protected areas came from central organs. On the side of a win-win style, it is said and believed that

there is more participation of villagers in decision making of issues related to the conservation of the neighboring areas. However, the question that remains is who determines the roles and how the benefit will be shared. On roles, it is not ordinary villagers who decide what to do but the central nature protection authorities. Therefore, it is correct to term villagers' roles in all the phases as more ascribed rather than achieved.

2.3 Forest Conservation in Tanzania

The Tanzania Forest Act (2002) explicitly provides for four types of forests in Tanzania: National Forest Reserves under the central government, Local Authority Forest Reserves under the local government, Village Forests Reserves managed and owned by villagers, and Private Forests that are owned and managed by one or more individuals under traditional rights of tenure and forests located in general land of which the rights are given to individuals, groups, or corporates. Following the problem of degradation and deforestation, fundamental efforts are made so as to conserve them.

Zahabu shows that, the forest sector in Tanzania is presently facing a crisis highly triggered by the biofuel extraction and other livelihood generation activities that are directly or indirectly related to forests. It is estimated that 412,200ha of forests were lost annually in 1990 to 2000s. It is from this alarming danger that both local and global attention to conserve and save these degraded and deforested forests was/is encouraged (Zahabu, 2008 in Yanda, 2012).

Generally, forest conservation in Tanzania is not a new phenomenon as it can be dated back from colonial administration in Tanganyika: both in German and British rule in areas like Tanga Region. The manner in which conservation was applied was coercive in nature and it (conservation) was highly affected by

plantation (commercial) agriculture that needed more land expansion to meet the demand for raw materials (Hamilton and Bensted, 1989 in Vihemäki, 2005).

After the colonial era conservation of forests was done to get instrumental value out of forests: as a way of getting timber and protection purposes (for example preservation of water catchment and control of soil erosion). Forest management institutions at this time were highly centralized and created a protectionist and fortress approach to nature. This centralized management resulted into more forest destruction by some officers at the local level who were very corrupt and they needed money from timber extraction licensing. Many officers have enriched themselves from government forest products. One of the deforested forests due to corrupt leaders was Shengena and Amani Nature Reserve, to mention but a few (Vihemäki, 2005).

Post-colonial time witnessed massive commitment of trans-national players in the management of forests partly as a way of building local capacity and technical assistance on forestry for commerce, and later on for conservation. As an example, the involvement of the Finnish Development Cooperation (FDC) in the Eastern Usambara Mountain supported timber extraction inventories and later on moved on to conservation purposes. Other conservation projects were introduced in other areas too (Vihemäki, *ibid*).

Presently, there has been a continued call to pay more attention to the forestry sector as well as mainstreaming policies that promote environmental conservation including forestry sector alteration. This emphasis results from the observed increasing rates of degradation and deforestation in the Tanzanian forestry sector as well as the value of the tropical forests in sequestering carbon dioxide: as one of the ways of adapting and mitigating to climate change.

The Tanzania Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (2009) argues that, the phenomenon of deforestation is evident in both reserved and unreserved land. In order to minimize this problem, the Government of Tanzania decided to force villagers to reduce pressure on forests from charcoal making, firewood and timber extraction, building poles by centralizing the processes for them to get those mentioned services. For instance it was provided that charcoal and timber extraction would only be allowed by having a special permit from the authorities.

Moreover, for more improved forests the Government agreed to take part in the REDD process which aims at addressing deforestation as one way of responding to climate change. It is believed that with REDD villagers living adjacent to forest reserves will benefit from carbon credit as the result of reduced pressure on the forest areas hence improvement in the forest cover and afforestation. How the whole process is measured, analyzed, reported and verified, is still in the process of negotiation.

2.4 A Preview on Local People in Rural Development Tradition

According to Green (2003), people in the local settings have their own ways of living, doing things, and even standards of what fits them and what do not. When something new in terms of an intervention or project comes to them; before accepting it and participating in its activities they make careful economic and social calculations to see how they will benefit from it. If they are clear that they would not benefit from the projects individually, and in that case they have no sense of ownership of those projects then they start withdrawing. This withdrawal may be passive or active withdrawal depending on the nature of the project.

Facilitating development to the rural people should begin with the local people themselves who must be the ones to first identify the needs or problems of their communities, discuss them formally and informally with one another according to

their modalities of discussing their key issues in that particular community. However, this has not always been the case with many NGOs, not only in Tanzania but also everywhere where NGOs are found. These agencies have their own rules, and ways of doing things. They have their rules, objectives, visions and missions that in the long run have to be met. Sometimes they are under the pressure of delivering certain deliverables to their donor and so they skip some of the key issues. For instance, the structures of development workshops, which are always held in high-class hotels located far from the site of the projects, do change the idea behind the logic of participation. In this case the representatives of villagers and ordinary villagers have less importance to play in arguing against what will be reached as the decision in those workshops because partly they are in an extraordinary atmosphere but also they might not see it right to challenge the financiers. However, they also benefit from these workshops individually through allowances and other resources. In these workshops power relations are recognizable (Green, 2003).

When facilitating the implementation of development projects in different areas, Donors, NGOs and the Government use participation, empowerment and sustainable development as their development policy. In most cases these projects are designed/ originated from the top and so they are brought to the local people to get approval and so to be implemented. This methodology ignores what the people really need and what they do not need.

In their discussion about development, and particularly participatory development, Cooke and Kothari (2001) suggest that the relations between beneficiaries (who most of the time are local people) and facilitators (donors, academics, NGOs and leaders) have in most cases have unequal statuses. They present the nature of relation existing as tyrannical in nature. Cooke and Kothari

(ibid) identify three types of tyranny: tyranny of decision-making and control, of group, and tyranny of method.

The tyranny of decision-making and control assumes that there is dominance of financial agencies and funders who dominate existing legitimate decision-making processes under the rhetoric of participation. The second tyranny is whereby decisions taken in a group reinforce the interests of an already powerful group, and the last tyranny that advances the method addresses dominance of experts' methods over other relevant and useful methods, which may be found in the people in a respective locality. With these tyrannies the process of achieving sustainable development cannot easily be attained as it is seen to have no level field where all actors are freely interacting.

Many discussions about failure and unsuccessful strategies to development support the point that these strategies lack an important input from the real actors who are the people or beneficiaries. The argument is that what has always been there is the assumption that correct ideas come from the development experts. The development experts always treat the local people as passive subjects. So long as they are passive, they have always been seen as obstacles to their own development. To bring about development, these experts strive to weaken what they call people's conservativeness (Lender, 2003).

Cooke and Kothari (*op cit*) challenge today's development practice arguing that, while it was supposed for all parties to learn from each other through participatory learning, it is the people at the local level who acquire new planning knowledge and learn how to apply it rather than professionals to acquire local perspectives. This is because most of the time field workers are constrained by organizational systems and procedures which need them to deliver certain deliverables at certain duration. They argue that for projects to yield good results,

the two kinds of knowledge need to be incorporated in the course of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation as local needs are socially constructed and are shaped by local perceptions and so any strategy to development should reflect local experiences.

What is obvious in development practices currently is the conflict between experts and local knowledge, the former claiming to be more superior. This is actually a new form of domination. Enforcing people to accept expert knowledge that is actually foreign to them is what Hobbart (1993) calls “growth of Ignorance”. In the course of development it is expected to have at least an equal relation and recognition of local people as partners and key stakeholders in development and so their knowledge to be seen as crucial as the experts’ knowledge.

The paradox is, while the number of NGOs and donor funded programmes and projects is scaling up, most of the development projects are also not efficient, successful, and sustainable hence people’s living standards in the rural areas are slackening. Two major problems are identified by Vihemäki (2005) with regard to challenges accelerating this problem; firstly local people are perceived as project beneficiaries and not key actors with decision-making powers to influence decisions affecting the day-to-day development operations and also perceiving local people and local situation to be homogenous without recognizing the heterogeneity in terms of gender, age, sex, political affiliations, farmer and non-farmer groups, caste, and many other diversities.

To sum up this part, it is reasonable to argue that, development agents when facilitating rural development come with their roles and the methods for implementing the assigned roles. These methods ignore the local ones which would be used instead and provide positive results. They also ignore the

traditional local knowledge that is an important input for rural development. Ignoring local methods and knowledge may act as an obstacle to development because local people possess an adequate experience with their own environment and so they are well acquainted with how to master it.

Furthermore, because development agents and donors mostly determine the roles and decisions under rural development, it is likely for the people to promote and preserve the interests of donors and facilitators rather than local people's interests. There are areas where conditions have been sanctioned to the local people for them to qualify for certain projects. For instance for the REDD Project process to be funded, the Government of Tanzania was supposed to meet certain requirements including preparation of a strategy, workforce and other key requirements which meet donors' interests for the money to be channeled to villagers and NGOs implementing REDD.

2.5 Development Aid in Africa

Within the development aid context, we have on the one side those countries that provide development aid to the poor. They have power to assign roles on others. The powerless do not have the power to say no to the roles imposed on them. They may have to pretend to be implementing something they would not want to do but just accept because they want to impress the donor. They may be evidenced in situations in which most projects became unsustainable especially after the donor funding and people returned to their business as usual scenarios. A good example of this is the land rehabilitation program in Dodoma (HADO) during the 1990's. The program was financed by the Swedish Development Cooperation Agency, but the villagers went back to their daily life practices soon after the funding ended.

Much literature deals with ineffectiveness of development aid channeled to Africa. Andrew (2009) suggests that this failure is explained by both internal (within the recipient state) and external (global economic system) factors. Externally, development aid depends on the pledges made by the donor states that are also affected by the economic systems of those states. For the aid to be delivered the pledges need to be fulfilled. Internally, the success or failure of the development aid projects will depend highly on the context and socio-economic and political environment of the recipient country. Issues of leadership, reduced corruption, and policies in place, are the things that will determine the success of a project. In most African states the environment is not conducive for aid directed to them to function well. Issues of mismanagement of funds and corruption have been a hindrance to the successful implementation of projects.

Various scholars such as Ferguson and Lohmann (1994), Andrew (2009) and Landes (2000), suggest that there must be a consideration of social-cultural contexts of the recipient country as an important requirement for aid effectiveness. Landes (2000), for example, suggests that consideration of issues like local values, and attitudes as either initiators or impediments to the progress and so they need to be highly considered when channeling any development aid to the recipient country. He further argues that, donor agents and states have not made deliberate and affirmative efforts to comprehend the settings within which aid can be made to work and become effective (Landre, *ibid*). Thinking in the same way, Andrew (2009:13) asserts that “for the aid to work well it pays to acquire an understanding of the local culture before applying an interventionist paradigm because development efforts must be situated within the cultural context”.

Additionally, Ferguson (1994:1) in his study of Lesotho argues that “development agencies opt for standardized development packages” with little consideration of

local social realities. This leads to failure of projects to achieve the predefined goals and hence produce unintended objectives like that of Lesotho where instead of helping the poor people it expanded the bureaucratic state power. Therefore, all these scholars emphasize focus on the context in which aid is channeled so as to attain efficiency and effectiveness of development aid projects.

When inference is made to REDD+, there is a need to ask the extent to which the designers of the Project ensure that villagers accept and comply with roles assigned to them now and after the donor funding. Also the way these roles are ascribed to villagers in the Kolo Hills has created confusion and frustrations and so most of the villagers seem to be in a position where they find themselves disappointed by the process. It is true that the donor and the project facilitator lack the power to make things happen the way they wish. It is until they address all the confusions and meet the expectations already created in the minds of the villagers the future REDD will be fruitful.

Villagers are also wondering how they would benefit after implementing those roles assigned to them in a situation where corruption is seen in the already accumulated project money from fines and other penalties. There have been reported incidences of REDD-fund mismanagement and corruption. According to *Aftenposten*, a daily newspaper in Norway (Referred in REDD-Monitor, 2013), in this pilot phase of REDD implementation, there have been cases of fund mismanagement and corruption in the REDD projects facilitated by AWF (which is facilitating the Kolo Hills) and the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania (WCST) which is yet to be settled.

2.6 Research Gap

The literature reviewed in the previous sections has indicated clearly the importance of integrating the local people in the issues affecting their lives. The

roles they take and how they take them, is of importance in ensuring the attainment of a project's goals. Despite the fact that the reviewed studies showed the centrality of people's roles, the REDD and REDD+ Project literature has little to tell about what roles were ascribed to villagers in the REDD Project and how people take the ascribed roles. It is from this background that I had to embark on the study.

This study was carried out to fill in the research gap on the roles ascribed to villagers in the REDD+ Project and how they comply with the ascribed roles.

2.7 Conceptual Framework

Figure 2.1 presents the conceptual map through which conformity and compliance towards which roles ascribed to villagers can be analyzed. According to the framework displays, the donor, government, and NGOs ascribe roles to be performed by villagers. When ascribing their roles, there are promises they make to villagers on what they should expect as a result of their participation. These promises may be financial or non-financial depending on the context.

Moreover, donors, governments, and NGOs inherently possess economic powers and influence that in one way convince villagers to take over the roles.


On the other way, villagers create expectations out of the promises made by the development agencies ascribing the roles. They (villagers) also calculate the socio-economic benefits as well as the implications for them to take part in the ascribed roles by the role provider. These calculations are the ones that may lead them to willingly take up the roles or resist the roles.

From the local people's perspective it is the result of the calculations and expectations that determine their conformity and compliance. According to Green

(2003), when the local people feel that they are bypassed or at least not fully involved and they do not benefit from the Project in place they withdraw. Other determinants of their full compliance and conformity would be access and rights over resource use, the extent to which the project fulfills the promises it made, and the way the respective roles are communicated to villagers.

With full role compliance, where villagers feel highly self-esteemed, the overall goal of biodiversity and nature conservation will be realized.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework: Ascribed Roles and Conformity/Compliance Determinants



Source: Adapted and Modified from Green (2003)

3: METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

This chapter presents the research approach and design, describes the study area, the sampling procedures, and data sources. It then presents data collection and analysis methods.

The study is mainly qualitative in design although it also includes a few quantitative aspects. The use of qualitative methodology is engendered by its capacity to explore and describe the complexities of social reality and their social construction (Mason, 2002). Concepts such as role perceptions, motives behind taking or not taking roles under REDD+ are measured and perceived differently by people who experience them, and so they are socially constructed and thus the reality about them is complex. Therefore, studying them requires methods that go beyond what is observed.

3.1 Research Approach and Design

A research design provides for an organised arrangement and strategies of investigation or inquiry for gathering data so as to answer the research questions (Kothari, 1990). An exploratory research design was employed. This made the researcher capable of discovering new insights about the topic in question. A case study strategy was applied whereby the pilot REDD Project in Kolo Hills was studied intensively.

A case study design was applied because it permits the researcher to get not only a detailed and intensive view of a social phenomenon but also its flexibility and reliability (Fidel, 1984). This is because a case study entangles an analysis of the features of a single unit so as to deeply probe the diverse singularities that compose the existence of that unit with a view of generalization about the entire population to which that unit belongs (Cohen et al, 2000).

3.2 Study Area and Case Selection

The study was carried out in Kondoa District at the Kolo Hills forest area in Dodoma Region, Tanzania. The study area was selected because it is one of the areas implementing the Norwegian funded REDD+Pilot Projects in Tanzania. AWF (2012) identifies this area to be one of the highly degraded areas in Tanzania despite previous efforts made by SIDA and the Government of Tanzania to make it regenerate and achieve sustainable management and conservation. According to the national census in Tanzania, the population of Kondoa District was 429,824 people in 2002 (URT 2006). AWF (2012) describes the major economic activities in this area as consisting of peasant farming, whereby crops such as maize, sorghum, beans, finger millet, and pigeon peas are grown, and there are livestock keeping and other non-farm activities.


The Kolo Hills Project case was selected partly because I wanted to conduct my fieldwork in one of the REDD Pilot Projects in Tanzania. This idea came out of the impression that I got from the climate change lecture sessions during the first year of my master programme at the University of Oslo. In addition, I got an opportunity to work with the team of CCIAM researchers whose case of inquiry was the Kolo Hills too.

3.3 Population of the Study

The study population was villages in Kondoa District, and particularly those within and surrounding the REDD Pilot Project. Other stakeholders of Advancing REDD in the Kolo Hills Forest (ARKFor)Project such as facilitators, and local government officials were included because they are the main determinants of the project direction in terms of finance and technical issues.

The villages implementing the REDD Project and those surrounding are presented in the map of the Kolo Hills in Figure (Map) 3.1.

Map 2: ArkFor Project Villages and the neighboring villages



Source: *The University of Dar es Salaam Institute of Resource Assessment 2013*

3.4 Sampling Processes and Methods

Simple random and purposive sampling methods were employed so as to get the study sample. Purposive sampling was applied in selecting the study area, population, and the project to be studied. The rationale behind the application of purposive sampling to get the study area, population and the project to be studied was because the number of pilot projects currently being implemented in Tanzania is nine only and of these nine projects, some of them were still in their initial stage, and others were already under study by many other researchers.

Another reason for purposive sampling of the study area was my intention to study one of the Norwegian funded REDD+Pilot Projects in Tanzania, and the choice of the Kolo Hills came out of my attachment to one of the CCIAM Projects in Tanzania, which necessitated me to do my research in the Kolo Hills.

Other literal justifications for application of a purposive sampling is found in Devers and Frankel (2000:264) who suggests that, we go for “information rich cases.....that is people with greatest insight into the research question”.

Simple random (lottery method) sampling was used to get 11 sampled villages (for those under Joint Forest Management (JFM), Community Based Forest Management (CBFM), and the villages neighboring the villages implementing REDD). This was done so as to provide equal opportunity for each village to appear in the sample and hence to assure representation.

The sampling of the research subjects/respondents was done using both purposive and random sampling techniques. Simple random (lottery method) sampling was employed in the selection of 81 villagers for Individual Interviews from the sampled 11 villages. This was done randomly so as to improve representation so as to reduce bias in findings. Interviews were conducted with the adults aging

between 18 and 70 because they are key participants in village affairs, but they are also well informed of the conservation issues overtime. Adding up, purposive sampling method was used so as to get important information from the local government (that is from the village and district officials), informant from the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and the AWF Project Coordinator.

To ensure that the sample is representative, respondents in this research were of different attributes, with a view to ensuring that different categories were accommodated in the sample. Issues of age, gender, and forest management type were considered. The sample consisted of 44 females and 51 males.

3.5 Sample Size

Devers and Frankel (2000) suggest for the sampling process to be guided by ‘a sampling frame’ (which provides for criteria for selection of respondents) and the framework securing the respondents’ involvement in the study so as to make the research successful. In addition, Ary *et al* (1992) puts clearly that the sample size should put into consideration matters of accessibility of the population, techniques, time, and resources to undertake a satisfactory study. Besides, as provided by Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007:242), “the sample size should not be too large as it may be difficult in sorting and reading data but also it should not be too small because it will limit the issue of representation”.

A total of 95 respondents were involved in this study; 14 in focus group interviews and 81 in in-depth individual interviews. The sample distribution was as follows; 80 villagers, one official from the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, two officials at the district level, one local government leader in each of the 11 villages, making a total of 11 village leaders, and one NGO representative.

3.6 Biographical Features of the Respondents

Before presenting the findings, it was necessary to present the respondents' biographical features. The rationale behind is because there is faith in the assumption that research findings are highly shaped by the biographical features of the respondents. The respondents in this research were of different features to ensure that different categories were accommodated in the sample. Issues of age, gender, and forest management type were considered.

From the table below, I sampled 11 villages from both CBFM and JFM forest management type as well as the villages surrounding the villages under the project. The total respondents were 95; whereas, 91 were villagers from all the four cases, and four were project personnel from the NGO, the government and the Norwegian Embassy.

The gender composition of the sample was 51 males and 44 females. The reason for this difference is that, in some cases some few women were busy with their household chores so they could not make it for the in-depth interviews. Moreover, the large number of the sampled respondents was peasants whose daily livelihood sources were highly dependent on small-scale farming.

The eligible respondents for the interview were men and women adults aged 18 - 70 years who mostly take part to community work in the villages in Tanzania. The summary is presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Biographical features of the Respondents

Managem ent type	No. ofVilla ges Sampl ed	Age	Gender		Employment status		Total No. ofVilla gers Sample d
			Mal e	Femal e	Peasant s	Others	
Case 1 (C.V)	3	18-70	12	9	19	2	21
Case 2 (J.V)	3	18-70	15	13	23	5	28
Case 3 (Ng.V)	2	18-70	9	12	20	1	21
Case 4 (N.V)	3	18-70	11	10	21	0	21
P.Ps	-	18-70	4	0	0	4	4
Total	11		51	44	83	12	95

Source: Fieldwork, 2012.

3.7 Instruments of Data Collection

The use of different methods (triangulation) in data collection is suggested for the validation of the instruments and ‘confirmation purposes’ because the weakness of one method is supplemented by the strengths of another method (Hussein, 2009). The literature suggests that there is no self-satisfying method since there is a great possibility of distorting the reality of what the researcher intends to study by use of a single method in data collection.

To get a deep narration and description of roles’ expectation from AWF and the donor for villagers implementing REDD+ Project in the Kolo Hills, it was

necessary to conduct interviews, to observe directly, and survey different documents as source of secondary data. In-depth interviews with villagers, former Norwegian Embassy staff, Kondoa District forest officers, and the NGO Project Coordinator were conducted.

Group and individual interviews were used as they provided opportunities for elicitation of opinions, experiences and perceptions about the REDD+ process and its operations. Similarly, they helped to grasp information about change of roles and perceptions over time in regard to forest conservation and management. Through observation the researcher was able to see and comprehend what was really happening concerning the REDD Project, its operations so far and how it is perceived by the villagers.

i. Individual Interviews

According to Neuman and Robson (2009), qualitative research interviews involve a mutual sharing of experiences between the researcher and the respondent. It is the presentation of how respondents speak, think and organize reality as per their experiences. The rationale behind the application of interviews was due to its flexibility and its ability to make respondents open up freely. In addition, interviews are good as they help in discovering the underlying motives and desires. Before starting the interview the researcher has to design the guiding questions and build the ‘rapport’, that is, the respondents’ consent.

In the field, a total of 95 semi-structured individual interviews were conducted with villagers, village officers, Kondoa District council officials, AWF project facilitator and an informant from the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam. The aim was to get their personal perspective, attitudes and experiences towards role implementation and motivating factors towards the implementation of the REDD Project in the Kolo Hills. Most of the interviews were recorded except in those

meetings where the respondents were uncomfortable to be recorded. For those four (4) respondents who were afraid of being recorded the major points were documented in a notebook. This study applied both projective and non-projective interviews in all instances.

ii. Focus Group Discussions

Two focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with villagers in both participating and non-participating villages. This data collection method was applied so as to get a holistic view of how the REDD Project has been implemented, the roles, and the willingness to conform. Ulin et al. (2002) asserts that, FDGs give the researcher an ample time to make confirmation and comparison of the views attained during individual interviews and asks additional questions to minimize contradictions. With FDGs people tend to feel empowered.

I moderated these discussions by introducing key issues from the guide and then leaving participants free to discuss and explore the theme as they wish. The discussions were recorded under the participants' consent.

iii. Direct Observation

Neuman (1991:355) asserts that, “the field researcher scrutinizes the physical setting in order to capture its atmosphere and the context... so as to observe people and their actions”. Direct observation was done while proceeding with data collection using other instruments. Observation was a day-to-day activity while in the field. Likewise, I attended to several village meetings as another way of observing. Key issues relevant to the study were noted in the notebook.

iv. Documentary Review

The review of other documents concerning the REDD+ roles and how the locals and other stakeholders perceive them was done so as to complement the primary

data. Resources such as AWF documents concerning REDD in Kolo Hills, REDD+ documents from other pilot projects, from the Norwegian Government, Kondoa District council documents concerning JFM and CBFM and other publications, were secondary data sources. Before using these data, assessment and critical review were carried out to ensure their reliability, suitability and adequacy.

v. Validity and Reliability of Study Instruments

Singleton and Straits (2005) argues that reliability is about stability and consistency of the measurement. It is expected that the same measurement should provide consistent results when applied in different times by different researchers while validity is about the instrument measuring what it claims and is supposed to measure.

Applying more than one method of data collection was one way of ensuring validity and reliability. In triangulation, the weakness of one method was complemented by the strengths of another method.

Another way of improving validity was done through pre-testing of the interview guiding questions at Mnenia Village which is among REDD implementers and Itololo Village which is among the REDD negative village. These villages were chosen because they are informed about REDD.

3.8 Data Analysis Process

Qualitative data come in a complex way so the researchers need to take the procedure of analysis in a very careful and systematic way (Mason 2002). The data were transcribed verbatim and coded into patterns and themes in accordance with the research questions. Coding of the transcriptions involved picking, concentrating and transforming transcriptions into organized summaries which

reflected answering the research puzzle. Constant themes emerged were identified, explained and analyzed while supplemented by observational notes. Documentary review was done to justify the findings.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

Before going to the field, I obtained a research permit from the Institute of Resource Assessment (IRA) of the University of Dar es Salaam. This permit was taken to AWF offices in Arusha Tanzania and Kondoa District Council respectively so as to get access to villages in Kondoa District.

In the villages the villagers were informed of the research and its purpose, so that they could decide whether or not to participate in the study. Respondents were asked for free and informed consent to participate in the study. They were also assured of confidentiality of the information they provided as well as anonymity of their identity. To avoid name/designation mentioning, I assigned pseudo-names to all the respondents. For example, villages were assigned the following: C.V for CBFM villages, J.V for JFM villages, Ng.V for negative villages, and N.V for neighboring villages. Moreover, project personnel were assigned PPs, VL for village leaders, while ordinary villagers were assigned the letter V and committee members were named CM. Moreover, the use of digital voice recorder was done only with consent by the interviewees.

Furthermore, I did my best to adhere to and respect the research code of the University of Oslo which insists on such things as source recognition, honesty, accountability, and transparency. Thus, I avoided the misconducts emphasized by Neuman (1991) of fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism.

4: DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents the findings and discussions for each of the two research questions. Initially, it presents the roles, which the donor and the African Wildlife Foundation expect the villagers to accomplish and finally, the extent to which villagers agree and comply with the roles assigned to them in the REDD+Pilot Project in the Kolo Hills. I will emphasize the role description in the analysis of the documents from the Norwegian government documents and the African Wildlife Foundation, individual interviews with the project personnel and direct observation made by the researcher. Examination of the role compliance will be addressed basing on the interviews with village officers, committee members and forest scouts as well as ordinary villagers of Irangi (Kolo). These two research questions are then compared to see the total comprehension of the role at the project level and the role provider.

4.1 Roles which the Donor and AWF expect the Villagers to Accomplish

I want to use AWF (2010) also referred to in Maganga (2012) to draw the main description about role expectation, and thereafter I proceed to the specific roles. Presented in Table 4.1 is the framework indicating the key roles for ARKFor project. From this framework, Kolo community members are presented as the primary implementers and beneficiaries; the Norwegian Government is presented as the provider of financial support, advisor and overseer while AWF is put in the role as project coordinator and facilitator (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: ARKFor Key Partners and their Key Roles

Actor	Roles
Norwegian Government	Financial support Overseer and Advisor of overall project direction and progress.
African Wildlife Foundation	Project coordination and facilitation
Kolo hills communities	Primary implementers and beneficiaries

Source: Modified from Maganga (2012).

4.1.1 Roles of Villagers from the Donor Perspective.

The presentation of this part is based on the villagers' roles as specified by the Norwegian Government (represented by the Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania). Through its International Climate and forest Initiative (ICFI) the Norwegian Government is supporting a total of nine pilot projects including ARKFor. As explained by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009:1)

“...the goal of the project (ARKFor) is to contribute to the poverty reduction and climate change mitigation by enhancing Tanzania's capacity to use REDD mechanism for rural communities to reap tangible benefits from improved forests management and conservation”.

The Norwegian Government has assigned the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam the role of overseeing and advising all the activities regarding to the Project.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs specifies the villagers in Kondoa as key implementers of the REDD Project both as beneficiaries and key actors in participatory forest management to date and in the future. It extends that REDD

activities will be participatory whereby all villagers will participate through public hearings, meetings, forums, and outreach programs. The following is the quote from the contract,

“Communities of Kolo hills and partners in government at the Kondo district level will serve as key implementing partners both from the point of view of serving as target beneficiaries of capacity building, but also actors in JFM in the immediate and long term. Project activities will be designed through participatory framework with involvement of local community leaders and villagers through public hearing assemblies and awareness creation forums and outreach plans.... and participate in training and capacity building activities” (NMFA 2009:13).

I have examined the contract between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and AWF regarding ARKFor as well as other relevant documents from the Norwegian Embassy. Villagers' roles are explicitly defined through general provisions regarding involvement and participation. For instance, in the contract output 3 of the project description Kolo communities are presented as key implementers of forest and land management that will involve “forest management and land use planning activities”. Other statements in the contract insist on ‘local people’s involvement’ and ‘participation’ by using the already existing participatory forest management frameworks in implementation. Thus, villagers are to take part in two ways: through JFM and community based forest management.

Inferring from the above general statements concerning villagers' roles, one needs to examine the roles stipulated in the Tanzania's participatory forest management so as to understand what the Norwegian Government expects the villagers to undertake. In her own words, the Ambassador of Norway to Tanzania postulates that:

Through participatory forest management communities are engaged in land use planning and integrated activities to change agricultural and charcoal production practices...the Norwegian support to REDD in Tanzania has a strong focus on competence and capacity building (Klepsvik, 2012:1).

Basing on these general statements it was necessary to consult other sources for a more elaborate and explicit way of role expectation.

The interview I conducted with the former official at the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam Tanzania argued that the donor was not too prescriptive in regard to villagers' role under REDD+. The reason was that of leaving everything at the local level for them to determine what suits them best. All they wanted is to help Tanzanian communities to reduce loss of forests so as to tackle the problem of climate change as well as to work on their livelihoods.

In addition, he elaborated that; with the introduction of the REDD+ Project in the Kolo Hills there was no any legal binding instrument to bind the Embassy's agreement with the local people. However, there were project launching village meetings, which were documented for future reference. Furthermore, villagers are informally accountable to the NGO facilitating the project.

On the other side, the Tanzanian government was not fully involved in the project operations due to the corruption scandal of 2009. The Norwegian government found out that their grants channeled to the environmental sector in Tanzania of about 30 million USD were missing. This has been settled but still the Norwegian government was not comfortable for the government of Tanzania to have fully mandate of the REDD fund (REDD-Monitor 2012).

4.1.2 Villagers' Roles as planned by Project Personnel

Until October 2012 there was no any legal contract between Kolo Hill villagers and AWF regarding their roles and involvement in REDD+.

When interviewed, the entire Project personnel affirmed for the fact that most of the roles to be performed by villagers under REDD+ are derived and modified from Tanzania's PFM guidelines. They referred to the Forest Act of 2002 that has made an important change in forest resource ownership and management obligations to incorporate and involve directly local communities. It is from this transformation where PFM emerged as a central element in ensuring sustainability in managing and protecting Tanzania's forests.

Moreover, in all interviews with the experts (project coordinator and KDC officials), they told me that villagers are supposed to be the sole implementers of the REDD+ Project at the ground, and so all the responsibilities were to be guided and shaped by themselves in their collectiveness or through representation. Furthermore, these informants also told me that all villagers have a responsibility in managing and ensuring that the forest is not destructed. The key government official responsible for forest issues referred to the participatory forest management guidelines for Kondoa District when advancing the following argument:

“Generally villages involved in REDD Project are said to be the key implementers of the project now and after the demonstration phase. They are responsible for pinpointing their socio-economic activities to identify which one are sustainable and friendly to the environment, adopt environmental friendly activities as a source of income, and taking care of the forest using their own bylaws” (PP-1: Interview 2012).

From the interviews with another project personnel it was evident that there were forest scouts and village environmental committees which perform roles on behalf of all villagers in each village where REDD is implemented. This means that these committees undertake the responsibilities that formerly were to be accomplished by all villagers. The Village Environmental Committees are responsible for all the issues in regard to forest management, land management plans and overall conservation programmes. The following are the specific roles of the committee as per PP3:

“Committee members in the respective villages have to perform the following duties; to set meetings for discussing matters pertaining to the management of forest, formulate land use plans which will specify different land uses, to oversee the implementation of participatory forest management in the village, to coordinate and conduct patrols in the forest, to keep records and present them in the village assembly and full council meetings, to provide permit and receipts for the fees charged from harvesting forest products, to keep accounting and financial management of the forest products, and to deal with violators of the forest rules (restrictions) by penalizing them. They are also participate in carbon assessment. It is from these responsibilities where you can see how decentralized this project (REDD+) is and how participatory it is. Our duty is to provide a technical and expertise advice and support for committee members to perform their duties accordingly (PP-3: Interview 2012).

Other project personnel further explained that, for ensuring full participation and effectiveness in managing the forest in the project area, respective committees and scouts in all REDD+ villages under JFM have united to form an association which is called JUHIBEKO (Association of environmental conservation in Bereko and Kolo divisions). This association is under the mandate of REDD+ village environmental committees, and has to collaborate with the government to properly manage the forests. The following quote is from project a representative in regard to this:

We already have a community organization, which is led by village environmental committees participating in REDD+. Actually we have not registered and we plan to register it at the district level. They (members of this organization) are known as council of representative of participating villages. It is called JUHIBEKO. It is an arrangement for 15 villages that border the government owned forests (PP-3: Interview 2.9.2012).

As summarized by the project personnel two (PP2), key roles of villagers whether directly or through representation; is to get involved and participate fully in management of land and forests as well as benefiting from those forests. It is also expected that, these villagers should collaborate with the government in overseeing proper forest management. This is what he says:

Local communities are responsible for overall management of the forest in collaboration with the government. They are also entitled to benefit from the forest products according to how it will be determined by in their meetings (PP2: Interview 2012).

Furthermore, project personnel illustrated that REDD+ Pilot Project in Kolo Hills and in other places builds upon participatory forest management (PFM) as its entry point. As such it is almost the same roles which were established previously under participatory forest management which are to be accomplished during REDD+ with some additions on issues of alternative livelihood, land management, carbon credit and payment issues.

For sustainability of REDD+, it is very necessary to ensure the capacity of the local people who are the primary implementers of REDD+ is well built. The situation in Kolo is against Tanzania's commitment in building the capacity of the local people participating in REDD+ during the pilot phase. The National Framework for REDD (2009) provides for commitment to ensure that the capacity of the local communities is built. It indicates that, local structures would be given primacies in all REDD pilot activities. It further provides for

involvement of foreign organizations to be encouraged to participate with local institutions to improve capacity building in areas where there is limited local institution capacity.

Other project personnel have pinpointed the importance of integrating other local officers in assisting villagers' roles in key livelihood issues such as agricultural officers, beekeeping, cooperatives and others who may take the lead when project ends. Involving them only in the launching of the project and not during the day-to-day proceedings of the project activities seem to be unviable, as it will limit their capacity to act and assist villagers especially when the project is finished. If they lack this capacity, it will endanger the sustainability of the REDD+ Project.

On the side of officials there are still ambiguities in terms of what is to be performed by villagers especially when the Project ends. The NGO facilitating the Project has been contracting other institutions to perform most of the key roles of the Project. Many officers are not well integrated in the Project despite their experience with the area and the people, which could be an added advantage to the project implementation.

4.1.3 Villagers' Role as Benefit-Recipients

Parallel to the fulfillment of the day to day project responsibilities, villagers are entitled to receive benefits from both the revenues accrued from the project, other livelihood improvement services, land planning and the carbon credit as a way of compensation from abstaining from using the forests. The carbon credit will be received as a result of their participation in REDD+ as well as offering the ecological service by reducing emissions to a certain level.

Concerning livelihood alternatives, all the project personnel said that, all villages implementing REDD+ will benefit from the introduction of energy efficient

stoves which would use a small amount of charcoal. Additionally, there would be introduction of hydro-foam brick-making technology so as to reduce the amount of trees used in making clay bricks. Further, they would be supplied with tree seedlings so as to rely on home-planted trees, and modern toilets would be constructed. Insistence will be made on agriculture whereby introduction of agricultural extension services such as modern seeds, fertilizers, and other kinds of training would be made available. Alternative livelihood sources were introduced as a way of helping villagers not to return to their normal ways of life that was seen unfriendly to the forests. Such ways were heavy reliance on fuel wood, poor farming practices, and over reliance on agriculture.

So far, until when I finished my fieldwork in the late of October 2012, some few villagers were already given modern agricultural seeds, fertilizers and other training on good farming, (at least 12 villagers in each of the REDD+ implementing villages), tree planting programs, and sustainable energy alternatives training. The Norwegian Ambassador to Tanzania affirms for over 170 villagers/farmers who received improved seeds and other agricultural extension services that have resulted in increase in yields eighty times in the demonstration farms.

On land use plans the Ambassador had this to say “Under the committee of 50:50 gender composition, ten villages have completed land use planning as a means of considering long term aspirations to form the basis of securing land tenure and to achieve permanence in protecting forests” (Klepsvik, 2012:2).

I asked one of the project personnel about the carbon credit specifically the amount of carbon measured and the amount of money expected to reach the villages. He explained that the amount of carbon they have already measured is 1.6 million tons that includes only the biomass; they expect to save 20,500

million tons of carbon in the area until the project ends. Basing on the amount of carbon stored in their stock (1.6 million tons), test payment was planned to complete by early 2013 covering 21 REDD+ implementing villages. All villages were to receive the amount of USD 60,000/= whereby the estimated number of villagers in those villages is 61,000. The Project personnel interviewed said the following:

“The money will probably be released in early next year (2013). For us we do not have much compared to other pilot projects, it will be like 60,000 US dollars for 21 villages. In those 21 villages we have about 61,000 villagers. They said that instead of giving that money to individuals we should direct it to the construction of village land registry or a good village office because most of them do not have good offices” (PP-3: Interview 2012).

For the coming test payment, every family in participating villages will receive less than 1 USD for the carbon stored. But in the future, villages under JFM will share benefits with the central government. The government will receive 60% of the carbon credit while 40% will go to villages bordering the government forests. In CBFM all 100% will go to the villages.

Other project personnel affirmed that there was no any formal legal agreement between villagers and the donor/AWF explicitly describing the benefits that villagers are going to receive. Instead, he provided for the availability of the records of village meeting minutes explaining the decisions reached in every issue related to REDD+ project including the benefits. He had this to say:

“In reality there is no any legal contract between the NGO, the Norwegian government and the villagers concerning their participation and the benefits they are going to get. The project people orally presented all the benefits we are talking about, and each village documented them during village meetings when this project was introduced” (PP-1: Interview 2012).

In addition, he asserted that, villagers are promised by the NGO the financial recompense if they refrain from using the forest in the way they used before REDD+, and it is the main reason that makes REDD+ a win-win strategy. With this strategy villages take part in reducing emissions, and they are in turn entitled to financial and other non-financial compensation.

Fulfillment of the promises made specifically on benefits is essential for determining the way villagers will take up the roles ascribed to them. The Project has its part to play and so to demand villagers' side to be fulfilled.

Contrary to the above, some of the officials interviewed seem to be pessimistic concerning the project benefits to villagers. They pointed to the issues of benefit sharing as critical issues under discussion. Since the government will have to centralize all the payments and then channel them back to the villages, there might be some problems. Issues like corruption, unnecessary bureaucracies, and mismanagement may affect the expected benefits.

4.1.4 Participatory Forest Management (PFM) in Tanzania: The foundation on of REDD+ Roles

REDD Project in Tanzania is building upon the already existing institutional framework of participatory forest management (that is, joint forest management and community based forest management).

Participatory forest management is one of the efforts designed strategically to address deforestation through the involvement of the forest-neighboring communities in the 1990's after realizing the effect of the gap created between nature and people during the era of 'protectionist conservation'. The aim is partly to integrate the social, ecological and economic goals in conservation by involving the locals in conservation projects and that local people have more

knowledge about how well to take care of forests in a sustainable way because they are nearby (MNRT, 2009; Vihemäki, 2005). Baldus et al (1991). Mshale (2008) calls participatory forest management as “conservation by the people and for the people” focusing on the bottom-up approach so as to benefit the locals through sustainable management.

As provided for by the Tanzania National Forest Policy (1998) and Tanzanian’s Forest Act (2002), community participation in forest management in Tanzania was implemented and encouraged through different ways, including introduction of village forests reserves (VFRs) that are under management and ownership of villagers and establishment of joint forest management which is a co-management between the government and villagers adjacent to the central government/reserved forests.

Vihemäki (op. cit) suggests that, PFM is practiced so as to promote active participation of people in planning, management, use and conservation of forest resources. It is also a way of devolving responsibilities of land ownership from the central government to the lower units of the society (communities). JFM basically aims at capturing local support in conservation of forests and so to stimulate conservation in those forests that were left unattended, as they were known to be under the central government’s management. Under this category benefit sharing between the two is 40% for villages participating, and 60% for the central government.

MNRT (2009:11) provides Duru-Heitemba as one of the earliest forests to implement participatory forest management in Manyara Region after opposition against “command and control” system by villagers. Other forests like Mgori in Iringa had later imitated from Duru-Heitemba. Other forests like Gologolo forest

(Tanga) and forests in Morogoro, Kilimanjaro, Mtwara, and Arusha followed the implementation. These cases were found in different parts of Tanzania.

Under CBFM villagers are able to formulate their own forest and land management plans that specify where to graze, where to farm, where to get firewood, where to construct residence and other arrangements. Plans are supplemented by rules and regulations that later on become bylaws with legal recognition to shape adherence of the above plan. With the availability of plans and bylaws, in the long run they will obtain title deeds that will give them legal ownership right to be owners of the forest.

Current implementation of PFM in Tanzania goes hand in hand with the implementation of other income generating activities, environmental education and farm forestry for the purpose of supporting conservation (Vihemäki, 2005).

PFM has a clear legal back up from both the Forest Policy of 1998 and Forest Act of 2002. For instance the Act enables local communities to gazette, announce or declare forest reserves as villagers', and allow the villagers to enter into agreement with the government or other owners for JFM agreements..." the act "delegates responsibility for the management of forest resources to the lowest possible level of local management consistent with the furtherance of national policies". It is from this legal set-up that makes Tanzania the best country with the strongest local institutional set-up in the sector of natural resources management in the countries residing in the south of the Sahara (URT-MNRT 2009 Referred in URT, 2002).

i. Tanzania PFM Models and Roles

Table 2.1 is the classification of villagers'/communities' roles as stipulated in PFM guidelines. In the case of Kolo Hills there is neither a private nor

community forest. The only applicable for Kolo Hills is village land forests, which is under community based forest management and central government forest, which is managed jointly.

Table 4.2: Tanzania PFM models and roles

Legal interpretation	Roles of Individuals and communities in management	Common designation
VLFRs management by the entire community	Owner and manager	Community Based Forest management
Community Forest Reserves (CFRS) managed by a particular entitled group in the community authorized by village council	Owner and manager	Community Based Forest Management
Private Forest managed (PF) by individual designated households.	Owner and Manager	Private Forest Management
JMA where management responsibility is shared between either central government/local government and forests adjacent communities or transferred completely	Co-manager	Joint Forest Management
	Designated Manager	Joint Forest Management (this form is rarely practiced)

Source: Adapted from URT-MNRT (2009)

ii. Challenges Associated with the Implementation of PFM in Tanzania

Interestingly, the Forest Act (2002) does not provide an elaborate definition of PFM but defines in general participatory forest management as “a general, umbrella term developed by Tanzanian practitioners that describes different approaches to involving community members in the management of forests, both through community management as well as co-management approaches” (URT-MNRT, 2009). Besides, it is noted in Yanda (2012) that the central government has excessive control over forest management in all lands due to constitutional provisions that empower the president to hold the land on behalf of all the people. The Ministry for Natural Resources, the division of environment, the Vice President’s Office is likewise responsible for all local and international matters and negotiation related to environmental issues forests inclusive. The powers said to be decentralized seem to be more theoretical than in actual ways due to overlapping of these legislations.

Vihemäki (2005:1) in the course of presenting the politics of participatory forest management in Tanzania asserts that,

“...the implementation of participatory conservation strategies is shaped by and shapes the power relationships between state and community actors. The present conservation strategies are formally “participatory”, but the actual functioning of forest control is affected by other factors, such as the economic and political interests of the actors involved, and the history of people-state relationships. The involvement of “local people” in forest conservation does not make it a smooth and apolitical process: power relations between various actors intervene in the processes, and make forest control a complex, fragmented and dynamic issue”.

This assertion is supported by the current situation in Tanzania where in some instances political interests and decisions override the goal of participation.

Moreover, Vihemäki (op cit) criticize participation in natural resource management as suffering from the ‘economic bias’ simply because local people are taken as mere beneficiaries and not as key actors in decision making with all the powers in natural resource management and hence further deforestation and degradation.

Other literature depicts that, in CBNRM there is a tendency of treating rural communities as a homogeneous entity and forget that there are differences in gender, caste, wealth, ethnicity, age and origin. Further marginalization of minority groups like women, children and the poor in resource accessibility and benefits distribution is likely to be accelerated. This necessitates for a thorough reassessment of institutions, varied interests, and power relations in participatory natural resource management (Jones, 2006).

Other issues like negative attitudes consequent from the previous conservation projects, inequitable distribution of benefits accrued from the project, and human wildlife conflicts are said to be among the challenges affecting conservation in Tanzania (Mshale, 2008).

4.2 The Extent the Villagers Agree and Comply to the Roles Assigned to them in the REDD+ Pilot Project

This section presents the findings for the research question two that explored the conformity and compliance level among villagers to the given roles. Villagers had different perceptions and stands in regard to role compliance. It is from these varied perceptions that I decided to group them into three (3) categories namely: REDD-Ready villagers, REDD-Positive but disappointed villagers, REDD-Negative villagers. These standpoints were identified from the interviews with different villagers from both CBFM as well as JFM. For reference purposes, the number of villagers in the categories of REDD+-Ready and Negative is summarized in Appendix 4. The standpoint of each category is well presented below.

4.2.1 REDD-ready Villagers

This group is mostly dominated by village leaders and committee members. They feel that their forest has been destructed by human activities and extended pressure to the environment and so it is time to have a sustained use and conservation. The main argument for supporting the project is that destruction of the environment has caused and will continue to cause the shortage of rain as well as scarcity of other natural resources. They seem not to understand the role of the forest in reducing the adverse effects of climate change but they seem to understand the intrinsic value of environmental and forest conservation; as something inherently good regardless of what they get or miss today from the forests. The following respondent has the following to say;

“If we don't preserve the forest we are unlikely to have enough rainfall, trees for construction and other products in the future. Personally, I am very happy for this project because people will

no longer destruct the mountains. Every sub-village in this area has its own Forest (VL -1: Interview August 2012).

Another respondent added the following;

We understand nothing about CO₂ credit and other associated issues, we just hear it from experts. For the villagers in this area the most important for us to accept is our forest which is the main source of rainfall no any other reasons (V-6: Interview August 2012).

Very few villagers told me that they put project benefits as their reason for complying with AWF and donor roles. In this category, the main proposition was that of what the project promised to bring especially the carbon credit. Below is the depiction from another REDD-ready villager;

“They told us to either refuse or accept the project, but for me this project is something to obviously accept because it is very beneficial. See, they told us to not destruct the forest because sponsors will come to pay us in exchange of taking our carbon gas. Individuals who plant their own trees will get their portion too (CM-2: Interview 2012).

On another hand, some villagers have argued that leaders and committee members mostly support the project due to the fact that they benefit from project seminars, and workshops. Thus they argue in favor of the Project not because they believe in it, but mostly because it may bring benefits to them as village leaders. In the line of this observation, Green has the same proposition in his article about ‘globalizing development in Tanzania’ that, professionals of development projects in Tanzania and in other places has a tendency of conducting seminars and workshops in expensive hotels located far from the project site, where the villagers’ representatives attend and receive high allowances. In the workshops they therefore tend not to argue against the views of those arranging the workshops. This is because they do not see it right to

challenge their financiers. However, they also benefit from these workshops individually through allowances and other resources (Green,2003).

4.2.2 REDD-Positive-but-Disappointed Villagers

This category entails villagers disappointed by the REDD+Project in the process, benefits, costs and impact of REDD+ to their well-being. Issues of restrictions, limited benefits and disappointment with the process are the things that led to shift the positive-minded to negativity in perception. In most cases REDD+ is affecting both men and women in a different way due to differences on items that they used to get from the forest.

Interviewees in this group told me that they were attracted by the promises that were made during the launching of the REDD Project. They also said that these promises were not fulfilled as per their expectations and so they have changed the mind. The major promise was on carbon credit and some other promises which were based highly on improvement of livelihood sources such as improvement in agriculture through; provision of modern agricultural seeds and good farming training, provision of sustainable energy stoves, introduction brick making technology, bee-keeping, tree planting as an alternative source of firewood, and construction of modern toilets as one way of reducing wooden-toilets which increases tree usage.

Speaking while disappointed, villagers aired out their complaints against the Project coordinators and their committee members for not fulfilling their promises accordingly as very few members of the village benefited from the project. For instance, some villagers told me that only two villagers had been given materials for modern toilet construction and only 11villagers had been trained on good farming practice and received modern agricultural seeds.

Speaking with a lot of fury, a villager in the group interview had the following to speak out;

They promised us that there would be a certain percentage of money we would get from carbon trade although they did not specify how much. They also promised to provide the village environmental committee with facilities such as uniforms, and the office but nothing came up until now. At the moment, there are only very few village members (mostly leaders) who benefited and not the majority of villagers. I don't see why we should proceed with this project because what they promise is not what they exactly do (V-12: Interview 2012).

Another male member of the FGD had this to say:

When they launched their project in Kolo, they told us that sponsors of this project would help us construct modern toilets so that we don't use trees; they provide us with photographs of the expected toilets to be built. Later on they took those photographs and no toilets were constructed. I was told to dig a toilet hole that is in my house until today. Contrary to their promise they brought only two bags of cements, six iron-sheets, and one toilet-net for construction of two toilets for two Kolo villagers (V-23: Interview 2012).

In the same FGD another male villager added;

Most of the donors' money is misused and spent by officers who live among us. An ordinary villager who is concerned with day-to-day environmental conservation activities is bypassed by the so-called AWF. AWF brings its own people and other institutions to pay them so as they perform duties that would have been performed by the villagers in our area (V-29: Interview 2012).

There have been queries from villagers concerning the functioning of JUHIBEKO association and its mandate. Ordinary villagers feel that JUHIBEKO was formed

without their consent and that is why it is operating on its own ways as it penalizes people heavily as well as lack of transparency in its dealings. In presenting their discontent with the association, the following villager had the following to say to affirm this;

This project is oppressive and unfair to us. In the first instance we agreed but later they formed JUHIBEKO; which link together some scouts and committee members. Scouts and other JUHIBEKO leaders have been over- charging us for their own benefits. It has transformed itself as another way of conducting illegal deals. This association has sometimes bypassed the village committee members and work with village scouts on their own. I suggest of removing this association so that each village takes responsibility of their own forest area (V-48: Interview 2012).

The above dissatisfaction about the functioning of JUHIBEKO has led to several incidents of attack and life threats by villagers to JUHIBEKO scouts and committee members whereby there are scouts who were injured. One attack incident was reported to the Kondoa police station and further legal procedures were taken.

They also see the project as non-beneficial to them and it extends the burden to them, as it did not come with the tangible and viable alternatives. Nowhere to feed their cattle, no more free places to get firewood, no clear demarcations for where they can conduct different activities and the reserve. To them, the project is adding fewer benefits than the costs they incur for conservation. They see the project as denying them some of their basic survival needs. The following assertion depicts this:

Even if the tree branch is at your home premise, if you cut it you have to pay the fine of not less than 50,000/=Tshs. Most Tanzanians are very poor. So how can they live without firewood? We do not have even places to graze our cattle, look the way they

are weak. Few days ago there were people who were caught in the reserve collecting water and were penalized to pay 100,000/= for just fetching water. This is contrary to our former agreement; they (AWF and other Officers) put these issues on their own in the new bylaws they sent us contrary to what we suggested. On top of that this project is run like a personal project, no transparent accounting records which shows project revenues and expenditure (V-58: Interview 2012).

I found it important to inquire from the AWF. The project facilitator admitted that some of the promises were not fulfilled. He saw livelihood issues as a particular problem and he argued that this was because the AWF's contractor has not done it in a satisfactory manner. This contractor, Selian Institute of Agriculture, was mistakenly chosen without thorough review of its competence. It was after the feasibility study in 2012 when they realized that this contractor was only competent in agricultural issues. After this study the contract was reviewed and signed to other experts who are competent in non-farm livelihood aspects. On the inequity of the distribution of other benefits, he admitted that it is true those who benefited so far especially on good farming seeds and training were very few simply because it is impossible for the project to train all the farmers due to limited financial resource.

As reported by REDD-Monitor organization (2012), the same disappointment has happened to other REDD+ projects in other countries implementing REDD specifically in Panama. The project under the UN-REDD is alleged of not fulfilling some of the promises made to indigenous citizens in regard to their real benefits particularly the promised fund. This un-fulfillment has led to frustrations among the primary beneficiaries and so they decided to withdraw from the project after failure of all the possibilities to get what they thought they would get as per UN-REDD representative promise (they were promised to receive \$1.79 million for starting up REDD activities).

The report extends that the representatives of the indigenous people in Panama feel that REDD do not guarantee the respect and safeguard of the indigenous rights, no full and true participation of the people of Panama in project implementation, and it has been characterized by many other incongruence and inconveniences. They even feel that they are used by the REDD process. Arguing concerning the UN's commitment to observe and respect the rights of the locals, Loayza (2011) presented in REDD-Monitor website provides that:

“UN-REDD has made itself clear that; REDD+'s success will depend on the respect of indigenous rights and forest-dependent populations. Thus, consultation processes must follow general principles of fair access to information based on free, prior and informed consent of local communities involved”.

Hance (2012) adds that these discontents are happening not only resulting from funds but also it is something happening worldwide as the indigenous people are not very sure of their rights and livelihood security. He says, “The disputes, however, is about much more than just funds. Indigenous groups around the world are worried that they could be steamrolled by the REDD+ process, as they have been by many other past international and national initiatives”.

Arguing in regard to indigenous people disappointment, it is true that local people are making their own cost-benefit analysis as a way of assuring their own security and protection. They are in the process of making careful economic and social calculations of the tangible benefits the respective project has brought to their daily life. If they are clear that they don't benefit from the projects individually, and in that case they have no sense of ownership of those projects then they start withdrawing. This signifies why most of the projects run by the NGOs and the government are not sustainable.

This part has identified why some villagers in the Kolo Hills feel disappointed despite their acceptance of REDD in the first place. The project is yet to deliver the promises it made during its launch. It is very clear that if villagers remain disappointed, they are likely to go back to their normal ways of living, which would result into more danger to the forests and the REDD+Project in general. Also without securing their livelihood it is very hard for their survival while implementing REDD+.

4.2.3 REDD-Negative Villagers

Most of the villagers under this category are found in villages where the majority of the villagers oppose REDD+ Project. However, some villagers where REDD+ is accepted they are also negative to the project. They seem to be well informed of the agreed prerequisites of REDD+ implementation. This category entails villagers who see REDD+ as totally non-beneficial to them. One of the arguments is that, over time, they have been conserving their forests and other natural resources in their own ways by using different ways of ensuring social control and order so as to avoid misuse and destruction of the forests. The following quote from the group discussion conducted with REDD+-Negative villagers affirm this contention:

There have been environmental conservation programs before REDD+. This mountain has been well protected. We used to conserve the water sources, we were not allowed to make charcoal, nor cut un-dried trees. Fines were agreed which people were supposed to pay whenever they violated the bylaws. Due to these principles we were able to manage well our forests and that is why REDD people were attracted and they wanted to take our mountain (V-60: Interview 2012).

In addition to the above reason for negativity, the experience from the neighboring villages implementing REDD has highly influenced those who have not yet implemented the project and therefore resisting the process. The argument

they pose is that, REDD has made people strangers in their own land as they are no longer allowed to access the products which belong to their land. Also the fines people have to pay when caught in the forest makes them to be against the project. Some have compared giving out their forest as “taking an orange for exchange with gold” and others said “REDD+ is like a man who forces a lady to be his fiancée”. These expressions from the people who are negative to REDD+ reveals how they perceive their land to be worthy but also the power and the right to self-determination. One villager asserted the following,

“What we saw from our fellows implementing REDD+ is that, as soon as they accepted to implement the project in their villages, they were restricted to reach to some areas in their own villages and access some of the basic needs from the forests. We saw how they are pitilessly penalized and jailed after REDD+ operations in their respective villages. This is what made us to refuse this project as we depend heavily to this mountain”(V-61: Interview 2012).

Another reason for this negativity is the experience they have with other conservation projects such as those under TANAPA (Tanzania National Parks). Villagers have negative experience with Tarangire National Park and so they are directly affected by the Park dealings. Presence of fines, wild animals getting to residential areas, too much restrictions and other inhuman acts done to the locals, make these villages under this study to make a reference and think that REDD+ might also bring the same bad experiences to them. They also think that when the forest remains untouched, wild animals will get into their farms and residences to destruct their yields and harm them. The following is a quote from one of the villager;

“When they came to tell us about REDD, I saw their vehicle labeled with the TANAPA logo. We all understand that TANAPA is not a good thing because of the things they do to the neighboring communities; when they see people in the park with even a very small bird they force them to eat it with feathers while un-cooked.

We had to think of the possible risks and the way it would be when we accept this project and thought that we might put ourselves in danger” (V-63: Interview 2012).

This observation affirms Hance’s (2012) argument in the discussion of the Panama’s REDD unfulfilled promises that, all over the world indigenous people are not feeling secured with REDD+ in most key aspects. They have much worries as they may be flattened by the REDD process due to the bad experience they already have with the past international and local development programmes.

According to the AWF Project facilitator, another major reason for the negativity to the REDD+ process and implementation in some areas is de-politicization of the project. Some of the councilors and MP campaigned against REDD as a way of winning the votes. If they had supported the project they would have lost the election. The politicians’ stand is still embraced by the villagers and so they take it as a point of reference to refuse the Project. There was reality in this argument as even villagers were referring to their MP that he is also against REDD+.

“Some of our key leaders proved that REDD was something they never came across. Our MP put this clearly that REDD is something that came from nowhere and it is not understood at all. Imagine, a leader who is representing the people is affirming that REDD+ is something unknown do you think ordinary villagers would accept it? It was obvious that citizens saw this project as something vandalistic. We sent our councilor to request the District Commissioner and the District Executive Director to come to us and explain more about REDD+ but neither of them came until today” (V-65: Interview 2012).

URT (2010) has the same observation in regard to the political influence. URT provides that, in areas where the political opposition wing was strong it created the difficulties in installing the project simply because politicians were arguing against by bringing in the negative experiences of HADO project.

The above fact justifies the notion that REDD+ is not politics free. This project is implemented in the political context and not in the air. Administratively, it is the politicians who make laws and determine the work (policy) of the day. Inherently, political leaders receive villagers' allegiance because they originate from their areas and so they trust them very much. If this project is missing the support of the political leaders it is obvious that it will miss an important back up for it to be effective and efficient.

However, these citizens insisted on more training and education concerning REDD+ as well as learning from other villagers implementing the project so that they may be able to understand more about the benefits and other key issues before they decide to jump on it.

The discussion under this category signifies people's power to stand and defend what they believe suitable. Having the power to stand on their own regardless of the fact that other villagers are implementing this project reveals their capacity and power to realize their right to make decisions that favor their own interests. It is true that the international community recognize the rights of the indigenous people to accept or refuse REDD+ Project if they see it as unsound to them.

The study in the Kolo Hills by Batholdson et al (2012) illustrates unwillingness of Kolo people to take up the project, as they don't feel its ownership. Villagers perceive the project as a strategy from far and they do not.

5: ELUCIDATIONS FOR VARIED COMPLIANCE BETWEEN ROLE PROVIDERS AND THE VILLAGERS

This chapter explains why there were differences in compliance in the roles provided to villagers. In presenting this section, REDD+ documents as well as interviews with both villagers and project personnel will be used to explain why roles introduced to villagers were differently received as presented in 4.2 above. The findings presented indicate little compliance and conformity to the roles provided to villagers in REDD+ pilot project in the Kolo Hills. I also found that the level of compliance to roles was different per area wise depending on the level of REDD+ awareness and the ability to fulfill the promises and project benefits. Reasons and motivations for role implementation in REDD+ was also dependent on the experience they have with the current project as well as the previous conservation and non-conservation projects in their area and other neighboring areas. These explanations as well as other emerging issues are discussed in the following sections.

Moreover, in this chapter I will present the discussion about REDD+ and the local people concerns. This discussion is the depiction of why it is important for local roles to be given primacy.

i. Short Project Timeframe

The timeframe for this project is seen to be short by all stakeholders at the ground for them to comprehend it well so as to have one stand. The period of three (3) years is not enough to fulfilling all the processes for successful communication and acceptance of the project to all villagers. REDD+ has been alleged as an initiative from external that needed a long time for the locals to understand it well before implementing. The villages that had spent less time in accepting the Project earlier were the ones to benefit from the Project but those who were still

reluctant they might miss this opportunity. The following is a quote from the project personnel in regard to project timeframe:

“The time specified by the Norwegian government for AWF to complete the REDD project is not enough. Imagine implementation of all the activities like that of capacity building, livelihood issues, and carbon measurements in three (3) years’ timeframe... do you think there will be time to wait for all 21 villages with more than 61,000 villagers to accept the project? We used the majority rule principle to proceed with the project. Those refused might also have genuine reasons for their refusal; it is just because we did not have enough time to wait for everybody” (PP-1: Interview 2012).

For the purpose of meeting the project timeframe and deliverables it was very hard for the project facilitators to wait for a long time for villagers to decide. In most villages it took them one to three days to be made ready for implementation. In some cases single day was used for introducing the project, asking for acceptance and launching the project. This was claimed by villagers to be unpleasant to them because they still needed extra time to think about the project and its benefits before accepting or refusing it. They claim to be less informed about REDD because it was implemented in hurry.

Time factor has not only been a problem to the Kolo Hills pilot project but to almost all other REDD+ projects in Tanzania. To address this challenge, AWF has asked for extra one-year time (up to 2013) that was already granted to them. This would allow them to address remaining issues including those of persuading other remaining villagers to accept the Project.

ii. Unfamiliarity with REDD+

It was openly said that REDD+ process with its associated terms is very new and complicated to both project personnel and villagers for its full understanding and implementation. This complication has created difficulties in implementing

REDD+ on the ground. This in one way is among the reasons for a varied understanding among villagers. Project personnel-2 made it clear that, it has been very difficult for them to bring and communicate the project to the villagers in a naive and simple way for all to understand. As the result others had refused and withdrawn from implementing it while others are getting disappointed. He told me the following in his own words:

“REDD+ is a terminology that is new and difficult in terms of the process and meanings. For us to implement REDD+ we need to undergo a process that I myself don’t think I will get to understand all the process from A-Z. It is also difficult to communicate to villagers what it is. For instance, matters related to carbon measurement are not very easy to present to villagers; processes in accessing, designing, mapping, analysis and all other stages to validation are very complicated. Many villagers seem to be tired of the ambiguities. Others are already disappointed, and others have withdrawn because they fail to understand and so there are no well-defined answers to their questions” (PP-2: Interview 2012).

Another project facilitator, when explaining about the challenges they face in implementation, told me that the newness of the REDD+ concept is not only back-siding the process but has also compelled for more time in training than expected which means more time and resources to gain rapport from the villages. Extra resources spent to unexpected rapport issues have resulted to late fulfillment of the promises made to villages. This entails that unexpected resources used in training could have been used to finance other project issues. This extended activity has delayed the whole process and so more financial resources were needed to fulfill other promises made to villagers. The following is the quote from the interview:

“Because of the REDD Concept being new to villages, it is so difficult and complicated even to educated ones. You take more time in awareness and training than expected which means more resources and time. We had to use posters, simplified pictures, caps, and

brochures to build awareness. Initially we were actually chased in many villages because they thought we were there for land grabbing also for turning their land to TANAPA or other investors. Because we had some people outside the country doing these assessments, they thought those were the investors who are coming” (PP-1: Interview 2012).

Following the unfamiliarity and the newness of the project in their contexts both in terms of the project itself, benefits and content, villagers feel confused and hence frustrated. These frustrations led to differences in compliance to role provided under REDD+.

In relation to awareness building, UNREDD conducted various training courses to its parties, Tanzania inclusive concerning REDD+ key issues. Much of the awareness building activities and programs were at the national level. More than 100 staff under the Tanzania Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism participated in the training from 2010 to 2011. In addition, UNREDD participated in several public occasions including the Tanzania Annually Trade Fair conducted every year in the 7th of July for the purpose of REDD+ publicity (REDD+ Newsletter, 2011). However, these training programs were highly at the national level and very low at the ground.

In the Amazon, researchers has found that, the newness of the REDD concept brings in confusion hence it leads to negative perceptions towards the project. Local people saw it like a control mechanism that might dictate them what to do and what not to do. For instance, CIFOR organization presents the following quote (from Marina Comberg’s findings) to elucidate this;

“The idea of REDD+ is so new to them that it was interesting to see how it was perceived by the farmers and how they saw it as an opportunity to improve their livelihoods, but it was also interesting to hear about their concerns. Many of them see REDD+ as a command-and-control mechanism

another external force that has come to tell them what to do and will threaten their autonomy” (CIFOR, 2013).

Generally, if the concept itself is unfamiliar and cannot be well grasped and communicated to the villagers who are supposed to be primary implementers of the project it was discernible to see differences in compliance level hence very low adherence to the provided roles.

iii. Poor Participation in Key Decision Making Meetings

Local people participation in REDD+ processes has been very poor and so most of the key decisions are reached by very few members. Poor participation has led to ambiguities and poor understanding of the project hence affecting the compliance level. The overall percentage of villagers participated in project launching as well as day to day implementation meetings in all the sampled villages was less than ¼ of the total population in all 21 REDD+ implementing villages. It is very hard for the local people to attend village meetings especially when the meeting takes place during the production time. Most of the adults made it clear that they have been missing village meetings as the meetings were scheduled at times when they were busy with other duties like grazing and farming. To address this AWF has been paying participants to attend key project meetings.

Tz-REDD Newsletter (2010) put it clear that; the same situation is observed in the REDD+ implementation in the Southern part of Tanzania. Despite some efforts put by MJUMITA/TFCG to raise awareness and participation, both men and women have not been attending meetings concerning project's affairs until when they were told that the carbon test-payment was about to be conducted in 2012. MJUMITA/ TFCG also acknowledged this situation is worse to women compared to men.

Also, Karl (2000) in his presentation of how to monitor and evaluate stakeholders' participation in agriculture and rural development pinpoints the reasons for there is poor participation in most of the rural development. Quoting McGee and Norton (2000) Karl illustrates that, rural people especially women do not have time to participate in meetings especially when it takes them away from production. He further argues that, time has been a limiting factor for a fully participation of stakeholders in project activities and other decision making meetings especially when they make calculations and find that no immediate economic benefits from the project. The solution to this challenge has been payment for participants' time that in some cases seem to be challenging due to limited resources. The following quote portrays this:

“Rural people and women in particular, often lack the time to take part in meetings and decision-making especially if this takes them away from production. Consequently, payment for participants' time has come to be recognized as a factor of raising the quality of participation (McGee and Norton, 2000).

iv. Power Abuse by Villagers' Representatives

Ideally, most of the roles that were to be performed by all villagers are vested under committee members and scouts. Despite the 50:50 ratio of gender composition of the committee members, villagers were not comfortable with their (the committees and scouts) conducts and in some cases they wanted to have their own system that would ensure accountability and proper forest management.

From the findings it was seen that REDD+ project committees and scouts are becoming semi-gods as they have all the responsibilities on issues related to forests, and they can penalize as they wish because they have that discretion. In practice, they are accountable to the NGO facilitating the Project but not directly to the villagers whom they represent. This was evident when villagers in one of the oldest REDD+ implementing villages asserted that, since they elected

committee members and scouts neither normal briefing meeting, nor revenue and expenditure meetings was held rather they were busy attending seminars and reporting to the NGO office in Kondo.

v. Poor capacity of the Village Participatory Structures

The capacity of the village committees to make and influence project decisions for the villagers' interests was seen to be poor. They lack the ability to defend and stand for the people they represent hence failure in defending villagers' interests in different REDD+ discussions with the NGO. In most cases they still waited and received directions from the NGO facilitating the project. This was evident when committee members were bypassed in tree planting activity in Kolo Village. There were allegations by some committee members in Kolo that they have community-based organizations dealing with tree seedlings for sell but the NGO decided to buy tree seedling from the neighboring villages. As a result, the bought seedlings were left unattended and so they dried up. The following quote supports this point;

“We have several associations but were disappointed and bypassed. Villagers are not involved. We told them to buy tree seedlings from our village but they went to Mneniya as if we don't have people who have same tree seedlings here. One day I had a call from AWF telling me to collect seedlings and distribute them so that we plant in our village. Now as you can see, those seedlings dried as no one attended them. People were very angry.” (V-18: Interview 2012).

vi. Improper Application of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC)

Roles imposed on the locals were not similarly accepted and perceived due to improper and poor application of FPIC. Not all villagers were in a position to quickly understand the project so as to implement it. This is because villagers are heterogeneous in terms of understanding, education level, resources, gender and all other situations. In REDD+ implementation, free and prior informed consent is

one of the fundamental benchmarks and prerequisites for REDD+ according to the project designers. This is because if the local people willingly accept the project it would improve local ownership hence true participation.

However, there have been reported difficulties and complications associated with the observance of FPIC process due to being time bound, newness of the REDD process, and costs associated with it. From different interviews with the villagers, it was reported that implementing FPIC steps was a critical issue in the Kolo Hills as the time used was seen to be very short for villagers to understand and implement the project. Most villagers admitted that the time was inadequate for them to decide, and others complained of misunderstanding the project during the initial stages hence further disappointments. The following are expressions from different people in regard to FPIC:

“We were not given enough time to sit for a long time for us to decide whether we understand the project or not. They said that time was not enough for them to come back again for the same issue so it was a must to put clear our stand-point whether we want the project or not. We had no option rather than trying and seeing” (V-2: Interview 2012).

Another one had the following to say

“In the first place we did not refuse. We told them to wait for us so that we understand the project after internal discussions within the village and the lesson we would learn from other villages. AWF was not willing to wait for our time to decide instead they concluded that we don’t want to implement the project in our area. We are still insisting that more time is needed for us to accept the REDD Project. AWF’s too much insistence makes us speculative of its motives” (V-66: Interview 2012).

After hearing the above concerns from the villagers, I confronted one of the project personnel to get more elaborations from facilitator’s point of view

concerning how FPIC was conducted. The major point made was that working under a very limited timeframe was not easy for them to spend too much time and costs on FPIC issue by waiting for every villager to accept. However, in most villages all the decisions made were at least supported by 50% of participants in village meetings. He had the following to put in regard to this:

“We spent at least 2-4 days seeking for villagers’ acceptance and consent... bound to deliverables, costs, and time. I admit that two days were not enough for FPIC, considering the fact that REDD+ is a new concept and project for both of us”(PP-2: Interview 2012).

To make REDD+ roles successful, it was necessary for issues of FPIC to be well addressed as key determinant of role ownership and adherence. Reflecting upon the newness of REDD+ concepts and processes it was necessary to have more time in making villagers understand well what REDD is, the benefits associated with it, and their obligations before any further decision of implementing the project.

Generally, those presented are key issues in explaining differences in compliance to roles directed to villagers. This indicates how the villages are not homogenous units, but consists of people with different resources and contradictory interests.

The general observation so far indicates that local people are highly affected by the impacts of climate change. They also face many challenges due to their dependence on the general ecosystem and its land. This reliance makes them more vulnerable to climate change than other groups. With this fact, it necessary to give them the primary responsibility and roles in designing and implementing strategies designed to mitigate and adapt the climate change impacts. The rationale behind is their experience with their surroundings in which they were able to observe changes in the ecosystem over time would lead to a more relevant

knowledge on how to address and mitigate the impact of those changes in the ecosystem (Fincke, 2010).

Despite the above observation, local people to some extent have been not fully integrated by the REDD+ Project. Hence, they feel uncertain about whether REDD+ is really going to safeguard their interests and welfare. This is similar to the depiction by URT (2010) that, local people in most places feel insecure with the introduction of REDD+ in their areas. URT further brings in the example from the REDD+ project in the Kolo Hills where villagers explained their worries and dissatisfaction towards project introduction. Their immediate perceptions were greatly influenced by the background of previous land related undertakings done by Dodoma Land Rehabilitation Program (HADO) that moved many people into eroded areas unfairly. In addition, there was the issue of land grabbing by a foreign investor during HADO time.

6: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY

This chapter presents the summary of this study, and draws major conclusions based on the findings of the study. The chapter also provides recommendations on policy issues, actions and for further research.

6.1 Summary of the Study

This study sought to examine the roles ascribed to villagers in the REDD+ project in the Kolo Hills forest in Kondoa District Tanzania. Specifically, this study was guided by three research questions namely; what are the roles that the African Wildlife Foundation and donors expect villagers to take in the pilot project for REDD at Kolo Hills? To what extent the villagers agree and comply with the roles assigned to them in the REDD pilot project? And how do issues of role compliance and in compliance can be explained? To answer these research questions, the study applied qualitative case study method to uncover the truth about the theme. However, very few aspects of quantitative methods were deployed.

Purposive and simple random sampling techniques were employed in order to obtain participants for the study. Purposive sampling was applied to get the population of study, who are Kolo Hills natives. Besides, purposive sampling was applied in accessing project personnel, as well as village leaders. This was done so as to get key information about the project roles. Moreover, lottery simple random sampling was employed to select villages as well as villagers from different forest management types for the interviews; both group and individual interviews.

The sample comprised 91 villagers from 11 villages implementing REDD+ pilot project in the Kolo Hills Kondoa, and four participants from the project level and

the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam. Therefore, this study employed a total number of 95 respondents. Direct observation, documentary review and interviews (both group and individual) were used to solicit information from the respondents.

The data collected were transcribed verbatim and analyzed according to the content, themes and patterns aroused in the process of transcription.

6.2 Summary of the Findings of the Study

The major findings of the research were presented and discussed according to the research questions. The main preoccupation was to make sure that the research questions are answered accordingly. The key issues in relation to the research findings are hereunder summarized:

6.2.1 Summary on the Roles ascribed by AWF and Donors to Villagers

In this aspect, villagers' roles presented by both the Donor and the AWF were basically the roles reflected in the Tanzania's Participatory Forest Management (PFM) framework. In order to understand the villagers' roles in the REDD+ pilot project there is a necessity of going through the PFM strategy. The strategy document provides a realm for villagers as forest managers through CBFM and JFM, to take part in land use planning activities, and to benefit from whatever the forest provides according to the accepted procedures. The framework provides for the village environment committees to oversee all the forest activities and other environmental issues on behalf of the citizens.

This is behind the rationale that, REDD+ Project is building upon the existing local institutional set-up in its implementation. Moreover, another justification for reliance on the PFM roles was because the Project did not want to be too

descriptive on what they wanted the villagers to perform rather, to make the project more participatory hence to have the local ownership.

Another key finding in this aspect was that of villagers' roles as benefit beneficiaries. From the project perspective, they are entitled to benefit from the revenue from the project, livelihood alternatives, land use plans, and the carbon credit by the end of the year 2012.

However, there is neither a contract nor any legal binding instrument between the Donor or AWF and villagers regarding partaking REDD+ Pilot Project roles. Further, there was no any mechanism in place for making villagers claim the promises made and the benefits they are entitled in the process of the role performance.

6.2.3 Major Findings on the Extent Villagers Comply with Assigned Roles

I assessed the extent to which villagers comply and conform to the assigned roles the findings indicated differences in compliance and conformity. Due to differences in conformity and perceptions towards taking up the roles I found it necessary to divide them according to their respective viewpoint. I formulated three categories namely: REDD-Ready villagers, REDD-Positive but disappointed villagers, REDD-Negative villagers.

a) REDD-Ready Villagers

The findings elucidate that REDD-Ready villagers are those ones who willingly accepted to take the roles ascribed to them under REDD+. They see their forest and environment in general to have been degraded and so there is a call for an action. Village leaders, as well as village environment committee members dominate this group. Conversely, they are alleged to have a positive compliance towards the ascribed roles because of the benefits they get by attending REDD+ project seminars and workshops.

b) REDD-Positive-but-Disappointed Villagers

The finding in regard to the group of REDD-Positive-but-disappointed is the representation of those villagers who previously willingly decided to take the roles. This group's perception is shaped by the disappointment in the process, benefits, costs and impact of REDD to their wellbeing.

Formerly, they were attracted to the promises that were made during the launching of the project. However, they were disappointed because the promises made were not fulfilled according to their expectations. The disappointments have made them to change their mind. Among the promises were building of modern toilets in the village, provision of agricultural seeds, training them in good farming practices, introducing hydra-foam brick making technology, bee keeping and tree planting programmes.

They also see the Project as not benefiting them instead it poses the burden on them. What they are calculating is what the project has added to them and the costs they incur for conservation. The project is adding less than the costs they incur for conservation.

c) REDD-Negative Villagers

From the findings there were villagers who seemed to oppose REDD+ pilot project and so perceived it as something intruding to their lives. This was the group of the REDD-negative. The reasons behind their negativity are because the project is not beneficial to them, and they know that they have the right to accept or reject the Project. Also they claim to have their own ways in which they can conserve the forests. Moreover, the findings depict that; they have learned nothing positive from the neighboring villagers implementing REDD+.

In addition, these villagers have a negative story of the previous conservation programmes within and outside their areas. Sharing the boundary with the Tarangire National Park in Manyara Tanzania is of a sad experience when talking of conservation and protected areas.

6.2.4 Findings on the Explanations of Varied Role Compliance

In regard to this aspect, I found various explanations as to why villagers were having different compliance levels towards role taking under REDD+. Issues such as short project time frame, the newness of the REDD concept and program, and improper communication of roles to the villagers can best explain the above situation. Moreover, poor participation of villagers in village meetings as well as in project activities have extended the ambiguities concerning the project and hence its non-acceptability in some instances.

In addition, the failure of the Project side to fulfill their promises made during project establishment has made villagers to be disappointed and feel frustrated concerning the project.

6.3 Conclusions of the Study

To date, REDD+ as an ambitious climate change solution has opened the way for more things to be performed in addressing climate change. However, REDD+ roles are inherently ascribed in nature. When roles are ascribed to individuals, they come not only with the benefits, but they also bring expectations on the side of the role implementer. Role implementers make calculations too of what they would gain or lose by taking the roles ascribed to them. If they find that benefits are less than losses, they may withdraw or pretending to take up the roles. The same situation is happening in the REDDPilot Project of the Kolo Hills.

In addition, roles are imposed in contexts where situations are heterogeneous. Villagers and their situations are not homogenous units, but consist of people with different resources and contradictory interests. It is the right time now for the REDD+ project to have full recognition of all these situations so as to address and deal with each group differently.

Furthermore, with REDD+ there is a possibility of insecurities because of the absence of legally binding instruments. Villagers are likely to keep on taking the roles but they would end up in difficulties when claiming back their benefits as role implementers. Inferring from this, REDD+ seems to be a risky business whereby some villagers have accepted to devote their time without any legal agreement like a contract.

Moreover, despite the REDD+ Project claiming to be a win-win strategy where villagers as role performers will benefit and help in reducing their rural poverty, the situation is different. REDD+ seems to bring more difficulties to Kolo Hills natives than before, as there is no already provided livelihood sources. Difficulties in accessing grazing areas, unavailability of places to collect firewood, and limited area to cultivate their crops to sustain their lives, seem to have been extended under REDD+.

In general, REDD+ is more of a fortress style of conservation despite its claim to be a decentralized conservation type. Most of the decisions are still centralized. Villagers have little say in regard to their roles and benefits. Most of the key decisions are still taken and influenced by the NGO and not an ordinary Kolo native. Village environment committees' capacity to act is still weak. With this situation, there is the possibility of having more of marginalization of the local communities than empowerment.

6.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions reached, the following recommendations were made:

A. Recommendations for Action

Since REDD+ is an initiative from outside which ascribed roles to villagers, there is a need to plan for an affirmative action to communicate the roles to the villagers. This will reduce the ambiguities and misunderstanding and therefore role conformity will be high. Special awareness programmes need to be designed so as to have awareness building about both the project and the benefits associated with the project. Then, villagers will be in a good position to decide whether to take part in the project or not to.

Since the REDD+ project has promised villagers certain gains, it is very important that these promises are fulfilled accordingly. Not fulfilling the promises decreases the credibility of the project to the villagers hence frustration and disappointment. Both the donor and the NGO must set mechanisms for fulfilling the promised benefits. It is better not to promise rather than to promise and never fulfill.

Additionally, the NGO facilitating the REDD+ Project must ensure full involvement of all villagers in terms of their gender, age, and other sub categories. This will improve their decision-making powers and so to have full ownership of the Project.

The livelihood aspect should be seriously insisted for REDD+'s sustainability. This is because if it will be taken for granted, there is a possibility of villagers going back to their ways of using forests in unfriendly ways. Communities

depend much on land and forests for their livelihoods. If their livelihoods are not secured they are unlikely to support the Project.

There must be external and internal benefit sharing and distribution mechanism that will safeguard villagers' interests. The strategy must also indicate a gendered benefit sharing as men and women access and use forest resources differently and so they have different needs.

B. Recommendations for Further Research

Several issues requiring further investigation emerged from this research. This study was based in only one case; Kolo Hills REDD+ Pilot Project. Consequently, it will be difficult to generalize the findings to other areas because the sample was drawn from few villages and not the whole area of Kolo. Therefore, another study should be conducted on other REDD+ pilot projects in other regions of Tanzania so as to get the fully picture of roles of villagers and how they comply with them.

Furthermore, a research on the formation and the operation of the villagers' participatory structures in REDD+ project in Kolo Hills Tanzania should be carried out. This is from the assumption that, it is these structures that assume the responsibilities of all villagers. Studies on their formation, capacity, and accountability need to be carried out.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Interview Guide for the Former Officer at the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam Tanzania

Key question: What are the roles that AWF and donors expect villagers to take in the pilot project for REDD at Kolo hills?

Guiding issues:

0. Narration of the preliminary issues concerning REDD pilot project establishment in Tanzania. How was the process?
1. What does the Norwegian government expect the villagers to accomplish (that is roles)?
2. How?
3. Was there any legal binding instrument between the Norwegian government and the villagers concerning villagers' participation in REDD?
4. What are the promises/benefits villagers should expect back when taking up the roles ascribed to them?
5. Is there any mechanism set on how villagers would claim the promises/benefits?

6. Are there any obligations associated to role fulfillment?
7. Reflection of accountability issues
8. To whom are the villagers accountable?
9. Mechanisms in place for the Norwegian government to ensure the fulfillment of promises and benefits from the project to the villagers?
10. What is the perception so far from the Embassy and Ministry about whether or not villagers fulfill the expectations?

APPENDIX 2

The Interview Guide for the Villagers

11. Reflections on their understanding of REDD+ project
12. Reflections on the process before and after the installation of the project.
13. Overview of what they have been doing before and after the coming of REDD+ in relation to conservation. How they take part in day to day project activities.
14. How do they accomplish what they are supposed to accomplish (direct or through structures? If there are structures, further reflection on the formation and the composition of those structures). Stress on the role of the villagers.
15. Examination of why the village participate/not participate in REDD Project and why are the village decided so?
16. An inquiry concerning the availability of incentives that they receive for participating in REDDS activities. The type of incentives.
17. How do the villagers perceive the project and its roles? How do they comply?

Perception on

18. Roles they are to accomplish in implementing the project

- 19. Benefits
- 20. Equity on benefit distribution, stress on issues of gender and other marginalized groups in the community
- 21. How just/fair the project is to the stakeholders
- 8. What are the challenges you encounter when participating in REDD project work

APPENDIX 3

Interview Guide for the Project Personnel

- 22. Narration of the preliminary issues concerning REDD pilot project establishment in Tanzania. How was the process?
- 23. What does the AWF NGO expect the villagers to accomplish (that is roles)?
- 24. How?
- 25. Was there any legal binding instrument between the Norwegian government /or AWF and the villagers concerning villagers' participation in REDD?
- 26. What are the promises/benefits villagers should expect back when taking up the roles ascribed to them?
- 27. Is there any mechanism set on how villagers would claim the promises/benefits?
- 28. Are there any obligations associated to role fulfillment?
- 29. Reflection of accountability issues
- 30. To whom are the villagers accountable?
- 31. Mechanisms in place for the NGO to ensure the fulfillment of promises and benefits from the project to the villagers?
- 32. What is the perception so far from the NGO about whether or not villagers fulfill the expectations?

Appendix 4: Number of Villagers and they are Compliance type

Cases	Number of Villages	Number of Respondents	Compliance type	
			Negative	Positive
CV	3	21	18	3
JV	3	28	15	13
Ng	2	21	20	1
NV	3	21	0	21
Total	11	91	53	38

Appendix 4: Free and Prior Informed Consent Form for Participation in Research

Dear, Sir/Madam

My name is Getrude Likango, a student from the University of Oslo, Norway. I am conducting a study to generate information on the Villagers' roles in the REDD+ Pilot Project. I wish to get information from you on the topic. The information thus gathered will be used to improve the REDD+ Project.

You were selected to participate in the study because you are an adult who live in the Kolo Hills. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to refuse to be in this study. If you decide to participate, you are free to skip any question that you may not wish to answer or may not apply to your knowledge.

Also, I ask you to accept the recording of the discussions for the purposes of avoiding missing key points.

Your information will remain confidential and will be used only for the purpose of this study. Therefore, you DO NOT need to write or provide your name anywhere. However, I would appreciate if you could write your signature in the space provided below to confirm your consent to participate in this study.

Signature.....

Date.....

Thank you for your cooperation.